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INTRODUCTION
As the sun rises over Boise, Idaho, on April 16, 2017, more than
100 young men are lacing up their cleats, trudging into warm-ups,
deliberating game strategy, and otherwise adhering to the Sundaymorning rituals they have developed over their careers as competitive
ultimate players.1 This particular collection of college athletes,
representing universities across the western United States, has
descended on Boise State University’s campus for the weekend to
compete in the first round of the college ultimate postseason.2 The
teams are already several games into the tournament, having
completed pool play just the day before.3 The games they are about to
play will determine who advances to the next round of the postseason
and whose seasons come to an end.4
Conspicuously absent from the scene unfolding on the fields,
however, is a nationally ranked team that has won every single one of
its games up to this point: Brigham Young University’s CHI (“BYU
CHI”).5 Repeating a story that had unfolded similarly in seasons past,
the Brigham Young University (“BYU”) ultimate squad entered the
first round of the postseason as a top team, beat all challengers on
Saturday, and then summarily packed its bags and went home,
forfeiting all of its qualifying games on Sunday and effectively ending
1. See Big Sky D-I College Men’s CC, USA ULTIMATE, https://play.usaultimate.org/
events/Big-Sky-D-I-College-Mens-CC-2017/ [https://perma.cc/6F4C-W5CD] [hereinafter
2017 Conferences]. Although the sport is colloquially called “ultimate frisbee,” many of
the sport’s athletes call it simply “ultimate.” See, e.g., Victor Mather, A Sport Without
Referees? It’s the Ultimate Debate, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/06/17/sports/ultimate-frisbee-debates-a-role-for-referees.html [https://perma.cc/3KXVHBBD (dark archive)] (using the term “ultimate” but acknowledging that the sport is
“popularly known as ultimate Frisbee”). This distinction stems from the fact that a
“Frisbee,” a product trademarked by Wham-O Inc., has not been the sport’s official
regulation disc since 1988, when Discraft discs were chosen to be the standard disc of play.
PASQUALE ANTHONY LEONARDO, ULTIMATE: THE GREATEST SPORT EVER INVENTED
BY MAN 2, 8–9, 29 (2007); see also DAVID GESSNER, ULTIMATE GLORY: FRISBEE,
OBSESSION, AND MY WILD YOUTH 256 (2017) (discussing the sport dropping “Frisbee”
as a product and a name); Ultimate, DISCRAFT, http://www.ultimate.discraft.com/
[https://perma.cc/PE68-7E6V] (advertising Discraft discs as the official disc for USA
Ultimate). This Comment will refer to the sport as “ultimate.” For a concise explanation
of the sport, its history, and how it is played, see GESSNER, supra, at 7–8, 32–38, 49–57.
2. See 2017 Conferences, supra note 1.
3. See 2017 Schedules and Standings for Big Sky D-I College Men’s Ultimate
Postseason Tournament, USA ULTIMATE, https://play.usaultimate.org/events/Big-Sky-D-ICollege-Mens-CC-2017/schedule/Men/College-Men/ [https://perma.cc/BZ7L-3BJY] [hereinafter
2017 Schedules and Standings]. For an explanation of tournament formats, see infra notes
60–62, 70–76 and accompanying text.
4. See 2017 Conferences, supra note 1 (showing that the teams finishing in the top
three would advance to the next postseason tournament).
5. See 2017 Schedules and Standings, supra note 3. For an explanation of the team’s
name, see infra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
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its season.6 The team yet again sacrificed its chances of advancing in
the postseason and pursuing a national championship, all in
observance of a higher calling.
The team left the tournament early in order to comply with a
BYU policy that prohibits its athletes from competing on Sundays.7
For years, the team has tried to convince USA Ultimate, the sport’s
governing organization, to accommodate its members’ religious
observance.8 These fruitless efforts, as well as the effects of BYU’s
and USA Ultimate’s respective rigid policies, have for years fomented
great controversy in the ultimate community. More important,
however, the situation has left in its wake a bevy of unresolved issues
between the parties, some with potentially momentous legal
ramifications.
This Comment uses the incipient conflict between BYU CHI and
USA Ultimate to analyze how anti-discrimination laws apply when
religious calendars and college sports schedules collide.9 This
Comment seeks to use the legal and historical development of this
area of law to extrapolate the legal implications present in the dispute
between BYU CHI and USA Ultimate. This Comment then aims to
use the novel set of facts to ascertain and assess the claims that BYU
CHI may be able to bring against USA Ultimate. Finally, this
Comment suggests a new mode of anti-discrimination analysis that
borrows intent- and effect-based aspects of burden-shifting tests to
better address effective discrimination when people in a protected
class encounter societal systems, structures, or schedules that
effectively discriminate while refusing to accommodate.

6. In 2015, for instance, the team won all five of its pool play games on Saturday
before the bracket games took place on Sunday. See 2015 Schedules and Standings for Big
Sky D-I College Men’s Ultimate Postseason Tournament, USA ULTIMATE,
https://play.usaultimate.org/events/Big-Sky-D-I-College-Mens-CC-2015/schedule/Men/CollegeMen/ [https://perma.cc/2JLF-KTRH].
7. For a discussion of BYU’s policy concerning competing on Sundays, see infra
Part I.
8. For a discussion of BYU CHI’s unsuccessful lobbying efforts with USA Ultimate,
see infra Section I.B.3.
9. While commentators have robustly discussed “the intersection of sport and the
law,” much of the discourse concerning the legal implications of discrimination in athletics
has oriented around federal laws such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title
IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972. Thomas M. Hunt & Janice S. Todd,
Powerlifting’s Watershed: Frantz v. United States Powerlifting, the Legal Case that
Changed the Nature of a Sport, in SPORT AND THE LAW: HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL
INTERSECTIONS 75, 75 (Samuel O. Regalado & Sarah K. Fields eds., 2014) [hereinafter
SPORT AND THE LAW]. This Comment focuses instead on possible applications of the
Constitution, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and various state anti-discrimination
laws to an instance of alleged religious discrimination. See infra Part II.
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The analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the legal
history of religious discrimination in the context of sports. This part
looks at National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) and
collegiate club sports, as well as BYU’s particularly storied history in
this area of law. Part II analyzes BYU CHI’s potential claims under
constitutional, federal statutory, and state statutory law. Finally, Part
III suggests a new mode of analysis that would provide a more
equitable means of handling alleged effective, unlawful discrimination
in a societal structure.
I. BACKGROUND: ISSUES WITH BYU, RELIGION, AND COLLEGE
SPORTS
A. The “Y” in All of This10
Brigham Young University, located in Provo, Utah, is a private
university founded and owned by the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, or, as many know it, the Mormon Church.11 The
vast majority of the school’s 33,000 students are members of the
Mormon Church,12 and the university implements an honor code that
requires students to abide by Mormon values and encourages
behavior in line with the Mormon Church’s teachings and
expectations of its members.13 School policy requires students to
respect Sundays, the Mormon Church’s Sabbath, as a day of rest and
religious observance; this particular rule prevents the university’s
10. BYU is often colloquially referred to as the “Y.” See GARY JAMES BERGERA &
RONALD PRIDDIS, BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY: A HOUSE OF FAITH 273 (1985).
11. Missions & Aims of BYU, BYU, http://aims.byu.edu/ [https://perma.cc/JB65KS4Y]. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints is uniquely “Americana” in that it
is “the only world-recognized religion to have been born in the United States during the
modern age.” DARRON T. SMITH, WHEN RACE, RELIGION, AND SPORT COLLIDE:
BLACK ATHLETES AT BYU AND BEYOND 20 (2016). For more about the history of the
Mormon Church, including its founding and development, see generally MATTHEW
BOWMAN, THE MORMON PEOPLE: THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN FAITH (2012).
12. See BYU Demographics, BYU, https://web.archive.org/web/20150424094326/http://
yfacts.byu.edu/Article?id=135 [https://perma.cc/Q692-CUAN] (showing that, in the fall
semester of 2014, 98.7% of full-time undergraduate students were members of the
Mormon Church).
13. See University Policies, BYU, https://policy.byu.edu/view/index.php?p=26
[https://perma.cc/6TR9-CHEK]. Much of the honor code concerns matters such as
academic and personal integrity. See id. (“All who represent BYU . . . are to maintain the
highest standards of honor, integrity, morality, and consideration of others in personal
behavior.”). Furthermore, it mandates baseline levels of decency and behavior for
everyday propositions like maintaining physical appearance and consuming foods and
beverages. See id. Since early in the university’s development, religious and academic life
have been closely intertwined. See BERGERA & PRIDDIS, supra note 10, at 47. For an indepth review of the BYU Honor Code and other behavioral policy mainstays, see id. at
93–130.
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athletes from competing on Sundays14 and has thus led to the current
conflict between BYU CHI and USA Ultimate.15 The ultimate team,
though, is not the first at BYU to experience scheduling issues
stemming from the Sunday-play prohibition. Instances of various
outside parties resisting requests to accommodate the studentathletes’ religious observation litters BYU’s rich sports legacy. This
perennial conflict has placed parties squarely at the intersection of
convenient sports scheduling procedures and concerns about
potentially unlawful religious discrimination.
B.

BYU and a History of (Alleged) Discrimination in Sports

As sports have grown from a purely recreational activity into an
immense commercial industry, discrimination and inequality issues in
sports have mirrored those in American society at large.16 BYU is no
stranger to this parallel phenomenon. For decades, BYU’s athletic
teams have experienced myriad difficulties with scheduling due to the
university’s prohibition on Sunday play.17 Throughout this time, the
school’s teams have had to work with, lobby, threaten, or otherwise
convince various organizations and governing bodies to craft
schedules that avoid conflicts with their religious observance. Overall,
the university’s sports teams have successfully obtained scheduling
changes, but often they have had to resort to applying varying means
of pressure—sometimes legal—on their counterparts.18 This section
will review those instances to provide subtext for the current conflict
between the university’s ultimate team, BYU CHI, and USA
Ultimate.

14. Adam Epstein, Utah and Sports Law, 28 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 107, 110 (2017);
Jeff Call, Never on Sunday: BYU Won’t Compete on the Sabbath Day, Regardless of the
Consequences, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City) (June 25, 2016, 4:45 PM),
https://www.deseretnews.com/article/865656920/Never-on-Sunday-BYU-wont-compete-on-theSabbath-Day-regardless-of-the-consequences.html [https://perma.cc/S4HG-7RS3] [hereinafter
Call, Never on Sunday].
15. See Daniel Prentice & Charlie Eisenhood, Florida Warm Up 2019: Tournament
Recap (Men’s), ULTIWORLD (Feb. 13, 2019), https://ultiworld.com/2019/02/13/floridawarm-2019-tournament-recap-mens/ [https://perma.cc/T359-D3RY] (“BYU, owned and
operated by the [Mormon Church], has a university policy that forbids athletes from
competing on Sundays. That has blocked BYU’s path to Nationals in ultimate, and USA
Ultimate has not made accommodations for the team.”).
16. Introduction, in SPORT AND THE LAW, supra note 9, at xiii, xiii.
17. For a summary of these difficulties, see Kevin J. Worthen, The NCAA and
Religion: Insights About Non-State Governance from Sunday Play and End Zone
Celebrations, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 123, 127–30.
18. See id. at 128–29.
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1. NCAA Sports: BYU’s Baseball Team and a Short History of the
Sunday Rule
The sports-scheduling issue first arose in the context of BYU’s
NCAA19 teams.20 Schools that participate in NCAA athletics—
especially large Division I schools21 like BYU—provide substantial
funding and support for their sports teams with scholarships, budgets,
and well-recognized allowances for student-athletes to miss class or
other school events in order to represent the university on the playing
field.22 In particular, BYU has committed significant resources to its
NCAA athletic programs by constructing state-of-the-art facilities
19. The NCAA is the primary governing body for major college athletics. ADAM
EPSTEIN, SPORTS LAW 57–58 (2003).
20. Worthen, supra note 17, at 127–30; see also Call, Never on Sunday, supra note 14
(noting that the NCAA created “The BYU Rule” in 1963 to “accommodate [BYU’s]
position on Sunday play”). For a chronicle of intercollegiate athletics at BYU, see
BERGERA & PRIDDIS, supra note 10, at 269–304.
21. The NCAA has three major division classifications: Division I, Division II, and
Division III. Divisional Differences and the History of Multidivision Classification, NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership/divisional-differences-and-historymultidivision-classification [https://perma.cc/N5B8-FAZS]. Member-institutions—i.e.,
colleges and universities—with NCAA athletic teams generally fall into one of those three
categories. See id. While one difference among the divisions relates to varying internal
rules—such as the minimum number of teams each member institution must have—the
most conspicuous external difference arises from the fact that Division I member
institutions can offer full athletic scholarships that attract better athletes, which in turn
effectively increases viewership and revenue generation. See id.; Our Three Divisions,
NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/ncaa-101/our-three-divisions
[https://perma.cc/6H29-UVGN]; The Difference in the College Division Levels, NEXT C.
STUDENT ATHLETE, https://www.ncsasports.org/recruiting/how-to-get-recruited/collegedivisions [https://perma.cc/N5K2-B5HN]. For example, BYU, a Division I member
institution, generated $67,733,712 in sports revenue in 2016. Brigham Young UniversityProvo: Revenues and Expenses, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. OFF. POSTSECONDARY EDUC.,
https://ope.ed.gov/athletics/#/institution/details [https://perma.cc/6K9T-9A3J (staff-uploaded
archive)].
22. See EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 58; Greg Johnson, Managing Missed Class Time Is
Part of the Game, NCAA (Jan. 11, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/
media-center/news/managing-missed-class-time-part-game [https://perma.cc/TXS3-RSNX];
see, e.g., Academic Processes for Student-Athletes: Class Attendance & Travel, U.N.C.
CHAPEL HILL, http://www.unc.edu/sacs/March2016/Web_Public/Docs/3.2.11/9.0-classattendance-travel-policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/G47Y-VPF5] (providing that UNC Chapel
Hill student-athletes may miss up to seven days of class per semester for athletic
competition, but noting that exceptions may allow for more missed class and that “[s]ome
teams require [such] exceptions”); see also Anna Orso, Penn State Athletes’ Perks Include
Scholarships,
Housing,
Food,
Entertainment,
PENNLIVE
(May
1,
2014),
http://www.pennlive.com/sports/index.ssf/2014/05/as_ncaa_reforms_loom_a_look_at.html
[https://perma.cc/U6E4-FFDF]. But see Andrew Carter, As College Athletes Travel More,
Missed Classes Come into Focus, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh) (Dec. 30, 2017, 11:41 AM),
http://www.newsobserver.com/sports/college/acc/duke/article192121459.html [https://perma.cc/
WH23-SXR3?type=image] (reporting on the increasing frustration of professors whose
student-athletes are missing more class due to travel as conferences expand
geographically).
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and “awarding generous athletic scholarships.”23 BYU has also
provided its NCAA athletes significant institutional support through
other means.24
BYU’s NCAA baseball team was the first to experience
significant postseason scheduling issues.25 The team performed well
throughout the 1958 season and postseason, qualifying for the
NCAA’s College World Series.26 The World Series schedule,
however, required teams to play on a Sunday.27 BYU requested that
the NCAA alter the schedule in order to allow them to play, but the
NCAA denied the request, effectively ending BYU’s season.28
Just three years later, BYU’s baseball team again had a
successful regular season, but this time the NCAA altogether
declined to invite BYU to participate in the postseason due to the
team’s Sunday-play policy.29 Foreseeing future conflict, the NCAA
soon thereafter crafted a religious accommodation rule that
prohibited scheduling NCAA tournament games on Sundays when a
competing institution had a policy against Sunday competition.30 This
rule became known as the “BYU Rule,” or the “Sunday Rule,” and
despite some instances of wavering commitment from the NCAA,31
the rule has largely remained in effect.32
23. BERGERA & PRIDDIS, supra note 10, at 279–80.
24. See, e.g., Academic Services (SAAC), BYU, https://byucougars.com/story/athletics/
1281428/academic-services-(SAAC) [https://perma.cc/J3KW-3UN8 (staff-uploaded archive)]
(detailing BYU’s Student Athlete Academic Center, which provides services and support
to facilitate and bolster student-athletes’ academic success); Incoming Student-Athlete
Frequently Asked Questions, BYU, https://byucougars.com/dl/sites/default/files/2017-08/
Incoming%20Student%20Athlete%20FAQ.pdf [https://perma.cc/A244-GRUJ] (providing
information about how BYU student-athletes “have access to an academic advisor,
content-specific tutors, a mentor, and a learning specialist,” among other academic
resources and support). Additionally, the school has given its NCAA athletes greater
flexibility in certain scheduling matters, including allowing student-athletes to postpone
their mission calls so they can compete contiguously throughout their athletic eligibility.
BERGERA & PRIDDIS, supra note 10, at 280. A prominent feature of the Mormon faith is
an expectation that young men serve as worldwide missionaries for one- or two-year
periods. BOWMAN, supra note 11, at 188–90. For many, this call to serve occurs sometime
during their college careers, which is why the exception is important for BYU studentathletes. See id. at 189 (noting that “the age for [missionary] service was standardized at
nineteen”).
25. Worthen, supra note 17, at 127–28.
26. Id. at 127.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 127–28.
30. Id. at 128.
31. In 1998, the NCAA, eyeing increased television exposure and other financial
incentives and noting that it was not “legally required” to implement the BYU Rule, made
moves to eliminate the policy. Id. After an internal comment and review period and
lobbying from BYU, however, the NCAA opted instead merely to modify the rule,
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2. BYU Rugby: The Second Coming of the Sunday Rule
Issues stemming from the Sunday-play prohibition, however,
have not been limited to the realm of NCAA athletics. Like most
other universities, BYU boasts a robust club sports program that
allows students to compete athletically outside of the NCAA
context.33 BYU’s non-NCAA sports program, which includes both
“extramural” and club sports teams, allows students to compete in a
wide variety of sports,34 albeit without the same level of funding and
support that the school’s NCAA teams receive.35 Arguably supreme
expanding its scope from allowing schedule changes for only Sunday competition to
allowing schedule changes for any day on which a competing institution has prohibited
athletic events for religious reasons. Id. at 128–29. Furthermore, the new rule allowed the
NCAA’s individual sports to waive out of this policy if it presented onerous scheduling
burdens. Id. at 129. The latter rule opened the door to the NCAA’s women’s soccer and
women’s basketball divisions to obtain waivers that allowed them to abstain from
implementing the BYU Rule, effectively threatening to prevent BYU’s teams in those
sports from competing in the NCAA postseason. Id. Yet again, lobbying and mounting
pressure from BYU led those sports to revoke their waivers, thus allowing the teams to
compete. Id. Shortly thereafter, the NCAA readopted a blanket rule requiring all NCAA
sports to alter championship schedules as needed to accommodate schools with a policy
prohibiting competition on a particular day for religious observance; this rule remains in
effect. Id. at 129–30.
32. For example, the NCAA recently accommodated BYU’s men’s golf team at the
men’s golf national championship by allowing the team to play on a Wednesday instead of
the scheduled Sunday. Ryan Lavner, NCAA Accommodates BYU with No Sunday Round,
GOLF CHANNEL (May 17, 2018, 7:26 AM), https://www.golfchannel.com/article/golfcentral-blog/ncaa-accommodates-byu-no-sunday-round
[https://perma.cc/S5X4-VDE9].
Also, for context, BYU and Campbell University, located in North Carolina, are currently
the only Division I institutions that maintain policies proscribing Sunday athletic
competition. See Worthen, supra note 17, at 128.
33. See Extramural Sports at BYU, COUGARCLUB, http://cougarclub.com/
athletics/extramural-sports-byu [https://perma.cc/WDQ4-SESX]; see also Club Sports,
DAILY UNIVERSE, https://universe.byu.edu/sports/club-sports/ [https://perma.cc/UH25B4KK] (reporting on BYU’s various extramural and club sports teams).
34. See Extramural Sports at BYU, supra note 33; Find a Club, BYU STUDENT
ORGANIZATIONS, https://clubs.byu.edu/clubs#/ [https://perma.cc/6C83-9YLS] (compiling
BYU’s club sports teams and other clubs into a searchable database).
35. See James Littlejohn, Extramural Sports Require More than Just Effort, DAILY
UNIVERSE (Dec. 4, 2007), https://universe.byu.edu/2007/12/04/extramural-sports-requiremore-than-just-effort/ [http://perma.cc/HME8-9BRL] (discussing the various levels of
non-NCAA sports at BYU and the nominal to nonexistent school funding those teams
receive). In fact, BYU CHI receives no funding from the university. Emilee Erickson,
BYU Men’s CHI Ultimate Team Looks to Remain Top-Ranked, DAILY UNIVERSE (Feb.
27, 2019), https://universe.byu.edu/2019/02/27/byu-mens-chi-ultimate-team-looks-to-remaina-top-ranked-team-1/ [https://perma.cc/6SAC-F6ER] (stating that BYU CHI “is not
funded by BYU and has to come up with funds on its own”). The varying levels of
recognition and support that BYU’s non-NCAA sports teams receive result from the
university’s hierarchically structured club sports program. Littlejohn, supra. The
extramural sports teams (women’s and men’s lacrosse, women’s and men’s rugby, men’s
soccer, and racquetball) sit atop this hierarchy, are fully recognized, and receive
substantial funding. See Extramural Sports at BYU, supra note 33; see also Jared Lloyd,
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among the extramural teams at BYU is men’s rugby.36 The program
has experienced resounding success, averaging only one loss per
season for the past twenty years37 and recently winning four national
championships in a row.38
The rugby team, however, had to fight fiercely off the field to
position itself to win those championships on the field. Starting in
1984, USA Rugby39 began scheduling its intercollegiate National
Championship Tournament to take place over a weekend.40 Given the
schedule, the championship match was slated to occur on the Sunday
of the annual tournament.41 Thus, despite its dominant regular season
performance, BYU’s men’s rugby team could not compete for the
national title because it adhered to the school’s Sunday-play rule.42
The team and the university, both of which felt as though they were
being discriminated against for their rules on religious observation,43
lobbied USA Rugby for twenty years to change the tournament

Ultimate Frisbee on Upward Course at BYU and Around the Country, DAILY HERALD
(Apr. 9, 2017), https://www.heraldextra.com/sports/college/byu/ultimate-frisbee-on-upwardcourse-at-byu-and-around-the/article_5dd77c45-1864-5094-99ca-8a254aa6c25c.html
[http://perma.cc/4ZAK-UV4T] (noting that BYU CHI “would love to see [BYU] raise
their status to a similar level as rugby and lacrosse as an extramural sport”).
Nonextramural athletic clubs are tiered into “recognized,” “in transition,” “restricted,”
and “not recognized” categories. Find a Club, supra note 34. Support from the school
varies depending on the team’s designated tier. See Littlejohn, supra (discussing funding
differences among extramural sports and the various club sports); see also Sean Connole,
BYU-CHI Ultimate Frisbee, GOFUNDME (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.gofundme.com/byuultimate-frisbee-team [http://perma.cc/K7SP-7NS3] (stating in a crowdfunding page that
“BYU does not recognize CHI as an affiliated sport or club,” which means BYU provides
“no funding, field time, or transportation” to the team); Lloyd, supra (noting that BYU
CHI “has no official ties to the university,” which means that the university does not fund
the team).
36. See BYU MEN’S RUGBY, https://rugby.byu.edu/ [https://perma.cc/D5KS-4CEY].
37. History, BYU MEN’S RUGBY, https://rugby.byu.edu/content/history [https://perma.cc/
ME46-SJ76].
38. Awards & Honors, BYU MEN’S RUGBY, https://rugby.byu.edu/awards-honors
[https://perma.cc/X3H7-UHGL].
39. USA Rugby serves as rugby’s national governing body in the United States. See
About USA Rugby, USA RUGBY, https://www.usarugby.org/about-usa-rugby/
[https://perma.cc/W8QH-KKYM].
40. Call, Never on Sunday, supra note 14.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. BYU’s associate general counsel, David Thomas, said, “We felt we were being
discriminated against because we were exercising our religion.” Jeff Call, Legal Scrum in
Past: Pressure Is Now on Cougars to Deliver Victories, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City)
(Apr. 2, 2004, 3:23 PM), https://www.deseretnews.com/article/595053284/Legal-scrum-inpast.html [https://perma.cc/K8UB-5CX6] [hereinafter Call, Legal Scrum in Past]. Jared
Akenhead, the team’s coach, said, “We felt there was some discrimination in not letting us
in and letting us challenge for national titles.” Id.
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schedule so the team could play for the national title.44 For twenty
years, though, USA Rugby refused to change the tournament to a
Friday and Saturday format, citing class schedule and financial
concerns.45
In the early 2000s, BYU and its men’s rugby team finally decided
to pursue a more pressing method of negotiation: threatening legal
action. The team recruited an attorney-alumnus to represent the
school and its rugby squad.46 Having informed USA Rugby of the
newly obtained counsel, the university assertively intimated that legal
action was on the horizon.47 BYU moved with more than deliberate
speed, quickly drafting a complaint and warning USA Rugby that it
was ready to file suit and formally start litigation.48 USA Rugby, with
the options of either engaging in expensive and potentially protracted
litigation or conceding to a resolution satisfactory to BYU, finally
agreed to alter its college championship schedule.49 It took twenty
years, but in 2004, BYU Rugby was finally able to compete for the
national rugby title again.50
This particular saga presents an interesting contrast to the
NCAA issues that began years before. Whereas the NCAA opted to
create a special rule soon after it perceived the possibility of
scheduling conflicts in its many sports, USA Rugby implemented
change only after the threat of a lawsuit inspired them to act. The
differences in approach by the two governing bodies may be
attributable to differences in purposes, resources, and general
context.51

44. Id. For context, the team had a 241–11 record during the period in which the team
was unable to participate in the National Championship Tournament due to Sunday
scheduling. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. As discussed earlier, the NCAA governs major college athletics for a wide variety
of sports, and the organization’s member schools generate enough revenue to often give
them significant flexibility in traveling and scheduling competition for certain days. See
supra notes 19–24 and accompanying text. NCAA student-athletes also receive substantial
institutional support from administration and faculty, which allows them to often miss
class in order to represent the university with relative ease. See supra notes 21–24 and
accompanying text. While precluding Sunday play for special circumstances may present
some difficulties, the NCAA has the resources and clout to overcome them. See supra note
31. Additionally, to the extent student-athletes miss more class because competition is
moved from the weekend into the school week, universities’ policies regarding their
NCAA student-athletes diminish the chance for repercussion or reputational damage in
the eyes of their professors. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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The factors at play in the rugby conflict were significantly
different than those typical in the NCAA setting. At universities, club
sports, like rugby, which do not fall under the NCAA umbrella, have
much less institutional or reputational clout, making it more difficult
for student-athletes to receive approval to miss class during the week
in order to play in games or tournaments.52 Furthermore, club teams
often receive much less, if any, funding from their schools, meaning
that the students must find other resources or pay out of pocket to
participate.53 Also, USA Rugby is a much smaller governing
organization than the NCAA, and it is oriented around just one sport.
USA Rugby, therefore, must allocate much of its resources to more
than just the college levels of play, like adult club and various youth
outlets. In terms of financial wherewithal, USA Rugby relies on
membership dues and donations to cover costs of operation, which
generate only a limited budget.54
Overall, the NCAA had the institutional capacity to more easily
implement the BYU Rule. USA Rugby, on the other hand, was
assessing its own capabilities, and those of its student-athletes, by
aiming to maintain a weekend tournament format. Some of those
same limitations, especially budgetary ones, also led to a quick
capitulation once BYU threatened legal action.55 Indeed, whether it
intended to or not, BYU’s men’s rugby team implemented a

52. See, e.g., VANDERBILT RECREATION & WELLNESS: CLUB SPORTS, OFFICER
HANDBOOK: REC CLUB SPORTS PROGRAM’S POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND RESOURCES
GUIDE 17, https://www.vanderbilt.edu/recreationandwellnesscenter/clubsports/club-sportshandbook-2017-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DSD-XGHC] (requiring club sport
participants to directly discuss potential class absences with professors, who are not
obligated to allow students to make up missed work, and indicating that club sports
commitments “do[] not excuse a student from academic obligations”).
53. See Crimson Staff, Fund Club Sports: The Athletic Department’s Hypocrisy in the
Spotlight, HARV. CRIMSON (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/
2014/10/28/harvard-club-sports-funding/ [https://perma.cc/7YY5-BRH5] (lamenting the
lack of funding that Harvard University club sports receive from the athletic department);
Owen Hill, Club Sports Struggle for Funding, OCCIDENTAL (Mar. 1, 2016),
http://www.theoccidentalweekly.com/sports/2016/03/01/club-sports-struggle-for-funding/
2875867 [https://perma.cc/ZXC9-PPU2] (detailing the expenses that Occidental College
club student-athletes must pay in order to participate); Gregory John “G.J.” Vitale, Here’s
What College Students Don’t Know About Playing Club Sports, ULOOP (Oct. 10, 2013),
https://tufts.uloop.com/news/view.php/101237/college-club-sports [https://perma.cc/BFL96A27] (observing the difficulty of financing club sports at Tufts University); see also
GESSNER, supra note 1, at 159–60 (discussing the financial difficulties of traveling to
ultimate tournaments).
54. See U.S. Rugby Football Union, IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt
from Income Tax pt. VIII (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2016) (reporting that approximately
eighty percent of total revenue in fiscal year 2016 came from charitable contributions and
memberships dues).
55. See supra text accompanying note 49.
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prelitigation strategy that capitalized on USA Rugby’s budgetary
limitations: the strike suit.56 The team achieved its goal by forcing
USA Rugby to evaluate its ability to afford litigation. This strategy
becomes especially interesting in the context of a statement by BYU’s
counsel in the rugby affair: “The law is clear that you can’t exclude a
team based on religious beliefs.”57 In reality, though, the law on this
issue is actually quite unclear,58 which presents the question: Was
BYU’s threat to sue a bluff that USA Rugby failed to call?
3. The Ultimate Version
A conflict similar to the one between BYU and USA Rugby has
been developing over the past several years, but this time in the
context of a different sport: ultimate. Although foreign to many,
ultimate is one of the fastest growing sports in the nation.59
56. This concept borrows from business law and other areas of law. See David
Orozco, Strategic Legal Bullying, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 137, 157 n.97 (2016). Essentially, a
strike suit allows a party with greater comparative litigation firepower than their
counterparts to garner a favorable result simply by threatening a lawsuit. See id. at 138–39
(discussing the fact that parties “increasingly wield the law aggressively as a blunt
instrument for strategic . . . purposes”); see also Strike Suit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014) (defining “strike suit” as “[a] suit . . . often based on no valid claim,
brought either for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated
settlement”). In other words, the strike suit is a strategic tool that uses the threat of
expensive, protracted litigation to force weaker parties to settle before a complaint is even
filed. Orozco, supra, at 142–43. Since the stronger party knows, or at least bets, that the
weaker party will concede defeat, the threatening party can assert “a baseless legal
position to derive advantage by exploiting the high cost of the legal system as a barrier to
seeking a remedy.” Id. at 143. “[T]he high cost of litigation . . . becomes an important
factor in the strategic decision-making process since the bullying target is unable to
finance its day in court. Knowing this, the [stronger party] can discount the cost of
litigation since a quick and favorable settlement is likely.” Id. at 155; see also Gary Myers,
Litigation as a Predatory Practice, 80 KY. L.J. 565, 565 (1992) (observing that instances of
what the author calls “sham litigation” are on the rise in anti-trust litigation). Although
litigation tools such as the motion to dismiss can mitigate an attempted strike suit, see
Orozco, supra, at 175, there remain real financial risks involved with calling the plaintiff’s
bluff. This fact is especially relevant when the law on the particular issue at hand is not
imminently clear. Furthermore, strike suits that result in settlements prevent judicial
precedents that clarify the law. The conflict between BYU and USA Rugby provides an
example of this, as anti-discrimination law in that fact pattern has yet to be tested. Indeed,
now the only relevant “precedent” to point to is BYU’s success in implementing a strike
suit to force a tightly funded sports governing organization to give in to scheduling
demands. This historical backdrop has set the scene for another potential showdown
involving very similar parties—BYU CHI and USA Ultimate.
57. Call, Legal Scrum in Past, supra note 43.
58. See discussion infra Section II.B.
59. About
Ultimate,
USA
ULTIMATE,
https://www.usaultimate.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/HPZ9-52SY]; see also USA Ultimate Membership Trends, USA
ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/membershiptrends/ [https://perma.cc/42YH-J5Z5]
(detailing rising trends in participation). For context, ultimate is a team field sport played
on a pitch that resembles a football field. See GESSNER, supra note 1, at 7. Play consists of
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Throughout its formative years, as the sport became more structurally
organized while remaining largely at an amateur level, the weekendlong tournament developed as the most common format of play.60
Such tournaments generally consist of “pool play” on Saturdays, the
results of which dictate how teams are placed in “bracket play.”61
Bracket play most often takes place on Sundays and culminates in a
championship game.62
The sport’s governing body is USA Ultimate, a 501(c)(3)
nonprofit organization based out of Colorado Springs, Colorado.63
The entity was founded in 1979 with the goal of legitimizing ultimate
as a sport and bolstering its growth and organization by facilitating
various levels of play and spearheading outreach.64 The organization,
which currently employs twenty professional staff,65 focuses much of
its resources toward facilitating its primary levels of club play at the
youth, adult, and college levels.66
Although all three levels of club play are thriving, the college
club ultimate scene, in particular, has developed rapidly over the past
several years, with increasing participation67 and greater

two teams of seven people on the field, and the object of the game is to advance the disc
from one end of the field into an endzone on the other end of the field. See id. at 7–8;
Steve Courland & Neal Damba, Ultimate in 10 Simple Rules, USA ULTIMATE,
https://www.usaultimate.org/rules/ [https://perma.cc/5XLQ-UPM2].
60. See, e.g., Big Sky D-I College Men’s CC 2014, Schedules & Standings, USA
ULTIMATE, https://play.usaultimate.org/events/Big-Sky-D-I-College-Mens-CC/schedule/Men/
College-Men/ [https://perma.cc/9ZS2-VKCX].
61. See, e.g., id.
62. See id.
63. About Ultimate, supra note 59.
64. LEONARDO, supra note 1, at 29; see also GESSNER, supra note 1, at 71–72
(detailing the organization’s early grassroots efforts to connect players around the country
in order to grow its base and legitimize the sport); USA ULTIMATE, USA ULTIMATE
(UPA) CHRONOLOGY, https://app.box.com/s/tqx77es2cwz1vryk7lrj [https://perma.cc/R79YH5GZ]. USA Ultimate also represents the United States internationally by fielding teams
that compete at international tournaments like the World Championships. See
International: USA Ultimate National Team, USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/
national_teams/ [https://perma.cc/H4CC-6ZPA]. USA Ultimate is a member of the World
Flying Disc Federation (“WFDF”), which runs World Championship tournaments. Id.
Recently, WFDF became a recognized member of the International Olympic Committee.
See id. For examples of the national teams, see USA Ultimate National Team, USA
ULTIMATE, http://nationalteam.usaultimate.org/ [https://perma.cc/PP6S-AKKH].
65. About Ultimate, supra note 59.
66. See USA Ultimate’s New Bylaws: Governance and Leadership for Ultimate in the
Next 10 Years, USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/news/usa-ultimates-newbylaws-governance-and-leadership-for-ultimate-in-the-next-10-years/ [https://perma.cc/3W25SU5L].
67. College Division, USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/college/
[https://perma.cc/SH57-73KR]. Currently, over 18,000 student-athletes represent their
colleges and universities on over 800 teams at USA Ultimate events. Id.
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legitimization through developments like USA Ultimate’s deal with
ESPN to broadcast college championship tournament games.68
The formal college ultimate season occurs in the spring semester,
running from January through May.69 During the season, most
“sanctioned” regular season games—those formally recognized by
USA Ultimate—are played in the conventional weekend tournament
format.70 By compiling results from sanctioned games, USA Ultimate
utilizes a connectivity algorithm to create rankings throughout the
season.71 These rankings are then used to allocate “bids” that have
postseason implications.72 The season ends with the “Series,” which is
a sequence of three postseason tournaments that lead up to and finish
with the National Championship Tournament.73 These postseason
tournaments advance from conference championships to regional
championships to the National Championship Tournament.74
Conferences and regionals are geographically based qualifying
tournaments, such that teams must place high enough at one in order
to qualify for the next round of the postseason.75 The aforementioned
bids determine how many teams advance from one round to the
next.76 The final objective for teams is to reach the national
championship game.

68. See id.; Charlie Eisenhood, USAU Signs Historic Three Year Deal with ESPN; Will
Add Live Games on ESPN2, ESPNU, ULTIWORLD (May 23, 2017), https://ultiworld.com/
2017/05/23/usau-signs-historic-three-year-deal-espn-will-add-live-games-espn2-espnu/
[https://perma.cc/3GCH-G9ZJ].
69. College Division, supra note 67.
70. See Tournament Calendar: Tournaments & Other Events, USA ULTIMATE,
https://play.usaultimate.org/events/tournament/?ViewAll=false&IsLeagueType=false&IsClinic=
false&FilterByCategory=AE [https://perma.cc/Z4CP-XEQ2] (listing sanctioned USA
Ultimate tournaments throughout the country).
71. See Teams & Rankings: Rankings, USA ULTIMATE, https://play.usaultimate.org/
teams/events/rankings/ [https://perma.cc/AU32-STGR].
72. See, e.g., Teams & Rankings, USA ULTIMATE, https://play.usaultimate.org/teams/
events/team_rankings/?RankSet=College-Men [https://perma.cc/LWK2-QUDF] (showing
rankings and bid allocations for men’s Division I college teams for the 2017 season).
73. Season Guidelines, USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/college/
guidelines.aspx [https://perma.cc/F7EF-7P2C] (detailing the postseason structure and
progression in the “USA Ultimate College Series Overview” section).
74. Id.; see, e.g., 2019 College Season, USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/
college/ [https://perma.cc/SH57-73KR] (offering a schedule for the 2019 college
postseason). The postseason tournament names are often shortened to “conferences,”
“regionals,” and “nationals.” See Season Guidelines, supra note 73.
75. See Regional Boundaries, USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/college/
default.aspx#boundaries [https://perma.cc/SH57-73KR] (demarcating the boundaries for
the various conferences and regions).
76. See Season Guidelines, supra note 73.
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BYU is one of these universities competing at the college club
level.77 The school’s team was founded decades ago but has yet to
earn fully recognized extramural or club status under the university’s
comparatively demanding certification standards.78 Despite its
tenuous status and relationship with the school, the team has become
increasingly organized and has risen in legitimacy since Bryce Merrill
became head coach in the early 2010s.79 Upon his arrival, he instituted
a new team motto—“Competition, Humility, Integrity”—which led
the team to operate under a new name: CHI.80 Under Coach Merrill’s
guidance, BYU CHI has generated greater student interest and has
performed increasingly well on the playing field.81
BYU CHI has become a veritable powerhouse and nationally
respected program, as evidenced by its entry into the top echelon of
USA Ultimate’s national rankings in the past several years.82 Despite
not competing on Sundays,83 the team has managed to play enough
games during the regular season to qualify for a postseason ranking.84
Their high level of success in those games has earned their region a

77. See Brigham Young (CHI), USA ULTIMATE, https://play.usaultimate.org/teams/
events/Eventteam/?TeamId=kB9yug7FXzHWqdcGUE7djiAcTF7pFOBRrxC1ZYbxWs8
%3d [https://perma.cc/3QK2-EBSL] (showing BYU’s roster and results for the 2017
college season).
78. See Lloyd, supra note 35 (noting that the team “would love to see the university
raise their status to a similar level as rugby and lacrosse as an extramural sport”).
79. See Marcus Awakuni, My Four Years at BYU as a Non-Mormon Player,
ULTIWORLD (Apr. 1, 2016), https://ultiworld.com/2016/04/01/four-years-byu-non-mormonplayer/ [https://perma.cc/K5AN-G7TW] (detailing how the coach’s “professionalism and
discipline” helped lead the team to greater success); Charlie Eisenhood, The 2016
Ultiworld College Men’s Coach of the Year, Presented by Nike Ultimate Camps,
ULTIWORLD (June 2, 2016), https://ultiworld.com/2016/06/02/2016-ultiworld-college-menscoach-year-presented-nike-ultimate-camps/ [https://perma.cc/ECP3-SGAA] (naming Bryce
Merrill as a runner-up for college men’s coach of the year).
80. Awakuni, supra note 79. BYU CHI is not alone in branding itself separately from
its university name and mascot. Early in the development of college ultimate, when teams
rarely received support from their universities, clubs created separate identities to
represent their individuality and independence, leading to names like Colorado Mamabird
and the Wisconsin Hodags. See LEONARDO, supra note 1, at 95.
81. See Awakuni, supra note 79.
82. See Lloyd, supra note 35; Teams & Rankings, supra note 72 (providing the college
men’s 2017 end-of-season rankings, in which BYU CHI finished fourteenth).
83. Because BYU CHI has not received the fully recognized status that the
extramural teams have, the team does not necessarily have to follow the university’s
prohibition on Sunday play. The team, however, follows the rule in adherence of its
religious underpinnings. Sabbath Observance Gets Athletes Attention, DAILY UNIVERSE
(Jan. 3, 2011), http://universe.byu.edu/2011/01/03/sabbath-observance-gets-athletes-attention/
[https://perma.cc/5YDZ-C2PJ].
84. Teams must play at least ten sanctioned games for their results to count toward
postseason rankings. See Season Guidelines, supra note 73.
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bid to nationals.85 The team’s geographically allotted USA Ultimate
conference is the Big Sky Conference, and its region is the Northwest
Region.86
BYU CHI, however, has been unable to translate their regular
season success to the postseason because postseason tournaments
take place on weekends.87 Not only do the qualifying games that
determine who advances to the next postseason round typically take
place on Sundays88 but USA Ultimate rules also mandate that any
team that forfeits games in a postseason tournament is presumptively
ineligible to advance.89 As such, due to BYU CHI’s adherence to its
university’s prohibition on Sunday play, the team has been unable to
advance beyond conferences.90
85. See Alex Rummelhart, Brigham Young Looks Past Sunday, ULTIWORLD (Dec.
15, 2014), https://ultiworld.com/2014/12/15/brigham-young-looks-past-sunday/ [https://perma.cc/
F24C-JHQX]; Teams & Rankings, supra note 72 (showing that BYU CHI earned its region
a bid to the national championship in 2017).
86. Under USA Ultimate’s geographically oriented postseason division structure,
multiple conferences constitute a region. See Regional Boundaries, supra note 75 (offering
webpage tabs that “detail the breakdown of conferences within each region”). In this case,
the Big Sky Conference’s geographic scope is Alberta, Idaho, Montana, Utah, and a dozen
counties in Washington. Id. (providing the Big Sky Conference’s geographic scope under
the “Northwest” tab). The Northwest Region encompasses Alaska, Alberta, British
Columbia, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. Id. (providing the Northwest
Region’s geographic scope under the “Northwest” tab).
87. See 2018 College, USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/archives/
2018_college.aspx [https://perma.cc/7NKL-YX79] (offering the weekend dates for the 2018
conference, regional, and National Championship tournament).
88. See, e.g., Big Sky D-I College Men’s CC 2014, Schedules & Standings, supra note
60 (scheduling the qualifying bracket games for Sunday of a Conference Championship).
89. The 2018 College Guidelines state that “[a] team must play all its games at a
‘qualifying’ tournament in order to qualify for the next tournament in the Series.” Season
Guidelines, supra note 73. The rules also allow for discretion from a USA Ultimate official
to make an exception to that rule, “provided it does not affect the fairness or integrity of
the competition.” Id.; see also Charlie Eisenhood, Breaking: No Postseason
Accommodations for BYU; Any Earned Bid Will Stay with Northwest, ULTIWORLD (Mar.
31, 2016), https://ultiworld.com/2016/03/31/breaking-no-postseason-accommodations-byuearned-bid-will-stay-northwest/ [https://perma.cc/HNA7-DV46] [hereinafter Eisenhood,
Breaking: No Postseason Accommodations].
90. See, e.g., Big Sky D-I College Men’s CC 2014, Schedules & Standings, supra note
60. The women’s ultimate team at BYU has also recently improved enough to realistically
contend for a spot at the National Championship Tournament, but they encounter the
same scheduling roadblocks that the men’s team faces. See Katie Raynolds, BYU Is
Undaunted: A Story About the Best Team that Won’t Play at Regionals, ULTIWORLD (Apr.
27, 2018), https://ultiworld.com/2018/04/27/byu-undaunted-story-best-team-wont-playregionals/ [https://perma.cc/S38K-BN28]. One athlete on the women’s team recently
lamented the difficulties of becoming a prominent program in the face of USA Ultimate’s
decision not to “make any exception” for the team’s Sunday-play proscription, but she
believed that the team is rightly adhering to its university’s rules: “[W]e are BYU, and
those are our standards.” Ciera Kueser, Army Sergeant Rediscovers Unity as BYU Frisbee
Athlete, DAILY UNIVERSE (Nov. 30, 2018), https://universe.byu.edu/2018/11/30/traveledarmy-byu-frisbee-athlete-sets-sights-high-1/ [https://perma.cc/LZ3F-MF49].
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BYU CHI has petitioned USA Ultimate to change the
postseason tournament format or schedule in order to accommodate
the team’s religiously grounded abstention on Sunday play.91 The
team has also publicly suggested alternative formats and vocalized its
desire to resolve the issue.92 Yet, despite the dialogue, the two sides
have failed to find an acceptable middle ground.93 The simmering
conflict reached a boil in the 2017 season when BYU CHI again
earned the Northwest Region a bid to the National Championship
Tournament and USA Ultimate again declined to accommodate
BYU CHI’s inability to play on Sunday.94 As BYU CHI continues to
improve its program95 and remains a top-ranked team,96 this issue will
certainly remain relevant in the coming years.97

91. For a copy of BYU CHI’s petition to USA Ultimate and proposal for alternatives,
see CHI Ultimate, USAU Justification & Proposal, ULTIWORLD, https://cdn.ultiworld.com/
wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/BYU-Proposal-to-USA-Ultimate.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CU7T-6Q4Z].
92. See Eisenhood, Breaking: No Postseason Accommodations, supra note 89
(including remarks from BYU CHI’s coach concerning the team’s disappointment with
the postseason scheduling); Sean Walker, BYU Ultimate Team Denied Entry into National
Tournament Over Sunday Play, KSL.COM (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.ksl.com/?
sid=39147979 [https://perma.cc/CAD4-SP2V] (quoting BYU CHI’s coach as indicating
frustration with the USA Ultimate’s process for taking suggestions for changes to the
schedule).
93. See Prentice & Eisenhood, supra note 15 (reporting that the team has continued
to discuss options with USA Ultimate, but noting that “there has been no progress
towards accommodations”).
94. See Charlie Eisenhood, Breaking: BYU Will Play in Conferences Champs, Keep
4th Bid in Northwest, ULTIWORLD (Apr. 4, 2017), https://ultiworld.com/livewire/breakingbyu-will-play-conference-champs-keep-4th-bid-northwest/ [https://perma.cc/7XP9-G9L7].
95. Indeed, BYU CHI started the 2019 season strong by excelling at Florida Warm
Up, a highly competitive early-season tournament. See Prentice & Eisenhood, supra note
15 (reporting that “BYU went 7-1 across two days of competition” and beat perennially
strong teams such as “Pitt[sburgh], Texas, and Carleton”). Writers at Ultiworld, a news
website that focuses specifically on ultimate, asserted that “BYU was arguably the best
team at Warm Up.” Id. The writers also projected that BYU CHI is good enough to
contend for the semifinals at the college National Championship Tournament. See id.
(titling the subsection about BYU CHI: “BYU Would Be A Semifinals Contender At
Nationals”); see also Graham Gerhart & Daniel Prentice, Stanford Invite 2019:
Tournament Preview (Men’s), ULTIWORLD (Feb. 27, 2019), https://ultiworld.com/2019/02/
27/stanford-invite-2019-tournament-preview-mens/ [https://perma.cc/CV2U-TBG8] (observing
that “BYU looked like a National semifinal caliber team at Warm Up”).
96. After BYU CHI’s success at Florida Warm Up early in the 2019 season, Ultiworld
ranked BYU CHI as the third-best team in the college men’s division. Will Johnson &
Keith Raynor, College Power Rankings, Presented by NUTC [Feb 20, 2019], ULTIWORLD
(Feb. 20, 2019), https://ultiworld.com/2019/02/20/college-power-rankings-presented-nutcfeb-20-2019/ [https://perma.cc/7ZXY-UD55].
97. See Prentice & Eisenhood, supra note 15 (“BYU’s continued success at the top of
the college ultimate scene will renew questions about their exclusion from the playoff
system.”).
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Throughout the course of this back-and-forth, BYU CHI, while
not explicitly threatening to sue USA Ultimate, has heavily alluded to
a potential lawsuit.98 Public comments from team representatives
have indicated that the team considers USA Ultimate’s actions to be
illegally discriminatory.99 Particularly given the litigation-strategy
precedent that the BYU men’s rugby team set when it successfully
forced USA Rugby to change its scheduling policy,100 BYU CHI may
consider a similar course of litigation strategy if it does not otherwise
obtain a favorable resolution.101
As this dispute has developed, the historical backdrop and
discourse surrounding the present affair have brought back into focus
a statement by counsel for BYU’s men’s rugby team: “The law is clear
that you can’t exclude a team based on religious beliefs.”102 Yet,
because BYU and USA Rugby resolved their near-identical conflict
before a complaint was even filed, no court could provide that
purported clarity. The current affair, then, offers an excellent
opportunity to analyze discrimination law in a new context because of
the unclear legal implications of USA Ultimate’s stance, BYU CHI’s
confidence that the team has a legitimate legal claim, the possibility of
another strike suit, and the novel issues that this fact pattern presents.

98. Eisenhood, Breaking: No Postseason Accommodations, supra note 89 (noting that
Coach Merrill did not reject the option of future legal action, and said, “We haven’t taken
anything off the table and we are considering all options, but we look forward to working
through [USA Ultimate’s] processes first”); Walker, supra note 92 (stating that “[Coach]
Merrill did not rule out potential legal action in the future”). In an interview with
Ultiworld, Coach Merrill invoked the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when answering a question
about BYU CHI’s requested accommodations. Charlie Eisenhood, BYU’s Big Day Opens
New Questions About Postseason Accommodations, ULTIWORLD (Mar. 26, 2016),
https://ultiworld.com/2016/03/26/byus-big-day-opens-new-questions-about-postseasonaccommodations/ [https://perma.cc/SDK2-9EV3] [hereinafter Eisenhood, BYU’s Big
Day] (“That’s a hard question. . . . I think it goes down to the Civil Liberties [sic] Act of
1964 that says you don’t discriminate on these things, religion included.”).
99. CHI Ultimate, supra note 91 (“Specifically, USAU’s preemptory refusal to allow
BYU to participate represents discrimination on the basis of religion because BYU’s
religiously-motivated policy of not participating in athletic events on Sunday.”); see also
Eisenhood, BYU’s Big Day, supra note 98 (featuring Coach Merrill referring to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 but also noting that BYU CHI “understand[s] that it’s not
Constitutional law, that ‘life, liberty, pursuit of happiness, and a chance at Regionals’ is
not listed in there”).
100. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text.
101. Indeed, BYU CHI is well aware of the strike-suit precedent established by BYU
men’s rugby. BYUtv Sports, Ultimate Frisbee Head Coach Bryce Merrill on BYUSN,
YOUTUBE (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-1fPY7YJvI [https://perma.cc/
T93T-YQQX] (hosting Coach Merrill, who observed that USA Rugby agreed to
accommodate BYU’s rugby team “in the shadow of litigation”).
102. Call, Legal Scrum in Past, supra note 43.
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II. POSSIBLE LEGAL OPTIONS FOR BYU CHI: IDENTIFICATION AND
ANALYSIS
Having explained the building discord between BYU’s ultimate
team and USA Ultimate, as well as the historical context that colors
the current conflict, this part aims to identify and assess the various
legal claims that the student-athletes could bring.
A. Identifying the Potential Claims
If it were to file a lawsuit, BYU CHI most certainly would allege
that USA Ultimate discriminated against the team for its religious
beliefs. The United States has a storied legal history involving
discrimination of many kinds, and an extensive body of law deals
specifically with religious discrimination. Under this particular set of
facts, two veins of federal law are important to analyze: (1) the
constitutional protections regarding freedom of religion and (2) the
prohibition of religious discrimination in places of public
accommodation found in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Additionally, states’ anti-discrimination laws also have the potential
to provide protection for BYU CHI.
B.

Assessing the Potential Claims
1. The First Amendment and Constitutional Protections for the
Exercise of Religion

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”103 Allegations of
religious discrimination—no matter the identity of the alleged
discriminating party—may bring to mind the constitutionally
protected right to practice the religion of one’s choice. For the
reasons outlined below, however, First Amendment protections do
not apply in this case, and BYU CHI does not have a viable
constitutional claim against USA Ultimate for infringing on the
student-athletes’ right to exercise their religion.
The fatal issue for BYU CHI is that this constitutional protection
restrains only the actions of the federal and state governments.104

103. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
104. E.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295
(2001) (noting that courts must uphold constitutional standards if a state actor is
responsible for allegedly injurious actions); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium
v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 737 (1996) (stating that “the First Amendment prohibits only
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Thus, to state a constitutional claim alleging a violation of the First
Amendment right to freedom of religion, a plaintiff generally must
allege either that the defendant is a government entity or is somehow
acting under the cloak of state authority.105 This so-called state action
requirement106 can be satisfied with allegations of private
discriminatory action only if the defendant’s conduct constitutes
governmental action107 or is sufficiently intertwined with
governmental authority.108 Mere private discriminatory action with no
connection to government authority will not give rise to a
constitutional claim.109
Several tests can determine whether a private party’s actions are
sufficiently attributable to the government to bring it within the scope
of the First Amendment’s protections: the nexus test, the symbiotic
relationship test, the joint action test, and the exclusive function
test.110
The nexus test analyzes “whether there is a sufficiently close
nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated
entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of
the State itself.”111 Under this test, the private action is attributable to
the government only if the state has used the private party as a proxy
actor or has coerced or encouraged the private party to act in such a
manner.112 The symbiotic relationship test considers whether the
government and private party have developed such an
‘Congress’ (and, through the Fourteenth Amendment, a ‘State’)” from infringing upon
constitutional rights).
105. See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 295–96; Magallanes v. Cracker Barrel Old
Country Store, Inc., No. 00-4231-DES, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1111, at *6 (D. Kan. Jan. 22,
2002).
106. Lyons v. Chase Home Lending, No. 3:11-CV-1056-N, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
120100, at *19 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2011).
107. E.g., United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 832 (1983)
(holding that a violation of “First Amendment rights is not made without proof of state
involvement”).
108. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982); Jackson v. Metro.
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (stating that “the inquiry must be whether there is a
sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the [defendant] so
that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself”).
109. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 349–50; Tilton v. Richardson, 6 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir.
1993) (noting that one’s right to freedom of religion is “not protected against private
infringement”).
110. See Schneider v. Cooper, No. 08-cv-01856-REB-KMT, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
125017, at *19–26 (D. Colo. Dec. 16, 2009).
111. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351.
112. Schneider, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125017, at *19–20; see also Brentwood Acad. v.
Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295–96, 298 (2001) (observing that the
factors that weigh into the nexus test are case specific and that “[w]hat is fairly attributable
[to the state] is a matter of normative judgment, and the criteria lack rigid simplicity”).
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interdependent, long-term relationship that the actions of either,
within the applicable scope of authority or normal dealings, can be
attributed to either party.113 The joint action test, on the other hand,
allows the fact finder to attribute government authority to private
actions if the private party willfully participated in government action
for a specific infringement of constitutional rights.114 Finally, the
exclusive function test allows for a determination of state action if the
private party “exercises powers traditionally exclusively reserved to
the State.”115 Such functions have included the administration of
elections of public officials, the operation of a company-owned town,
and the management of a city park.116
In this case, USA Ultimate, a private, 501(c)(3) nonprofit
organization, does not fall within any definition or extension of a state
actor. By virtue of its status as a private entity, it is clearly not a
conventional state actor or government entity. Furthermore, unless
USA Ultimate undertakes some action or responsibility that
intertwines it with the government, such as receipt of substantial
federal funding117—which is not an issue present according to the
most recent publicly available annual reports118—it does not appear to
have rendered itself a state actor.
In other cases, courts have already rejected conceivable factors
that could have bolstered the argument that a sufficiently entwined
state relationship exists between the government and USA Ultimate.
113. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724–25 (1961).
114. Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1453–55 (10th Cir.
1995). Some courts have treated this like a conspiracy between the government and
private actors to deprive rights. See Schneider, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125017, at *22–23.
115. Id. at *24 (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352).
116. Id.
117. In some cases, government funding can intertwine a private organization closely
enough to the government to bring it within the ambit of constitutional accountability. See
Anne L. DeMartini, Thirty-Five Years After Richards v. USTA: The Continued
Significance of Transgender Athletes’ Participation in Sport, in SPORT AND THE LAW,
supra note 9, at 97, 108 (“If an athletic organization receives government funding or is
highly entangled with the government, courts consider the organization a state actor and it
must adhere to both the US Constitution and appropriate state constitutions.”). For
example, BYU’s receipt of federal student aid renders it “answer[able] to the U.S.
government as an educational institution” for anti-discrimination law purposes. SMITH,
supra note 11, at 95. But see Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840–41 (1982) (finding
that a school’s receipt of substantial funds from the government did not render the school
a state actor).
118. USA ULTIMATE, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 66–67 (2017), https://www.usaultimate.org/
assets/1/Page/2017AnnualReport_LR.pdf [https://perma.cc/TC9W-UE2X] (listing revenue
sources for 2017, which included no government funding); USA ULTIMATE, 2016
ANNUAL REPORT 63 (2016), https://www.usaultimate.org/assets/1/Page/2016Annual
Report_LR.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZ9Z-KJVZ] (showing that USA Ultimate received no
revenue in the form of government grants).
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For instance, a 501(c)(3) entity is not rendered a state actor by virtue
of its tax-exempt status.119 In fact, courts considering whether a taxexempt entity’s allegedly discriminatory acts constitute state action
have generally found no state action when the purportedly
discriminatory acts do not involve racial animus.120 Additionally a taxexempt entity does not automatically transform into a state actor by
receiving some funding or grants from a government entity; it must
receive enough funding to create a substantially intertwined
relationship that causes it to pass one of the enumerated tests.121
USA Ultimate often holds tournaments, including the first-round
postseason tournaments in which BYU plays, at public parks or on a
public university’s playing field.122 A private organization’s mere use
of a public park, however, does not create a nexus sufficient to
establish state action.123 Although an argument predicated on the
theory that USA Ultimate is a state actor because it represents the
United States in international sporting events may seem too anemic
to even consider, a similar case has already been litigated. The case
concerned a Puerto Rican basketball organization, and the First
Circuit held that status as a national representative does not imbue a
private entity with the color of state authority.124
119. Stone v. Elohim, Inc., 336 F. App’x 841, 843 (10th Cir. 2009); see also N.Y.C.
Jaycees, Inc. v. U.S. Jaycees, Inc., 512 F.2d 856, 859 (2d Cir. 1975) (“[A] tax exemption
does not constitute government ‘sponsorship’ but instead ‘creates only a minimal and
remote involvement.’” (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 675–76 (1970)));
Chance v. Reed, 538 F. Supp. 2d 500, 507 (D. Conn. 2008) (noting that a nonprofit
organization’s 501(c)(3) status does not render the entity a state actor). The government,
however, has used the threat of stripping organizations of tax-exempt status in order to
indirectly compel compliance with civil rights laws. For instance, upon determining in 1970
that racist admissions policies at BYU and Bob Jones University were in violation of Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the IRS warned that it could no longer give tax-exempt
status to private colleges and universities that perpetuated racially discriminatory
practices. SMITH, supra note 11, at 96.
120. See Jackson v. Statler Found., 496 F.2d 623, 628 (2d Cir. 1973).
121. See N.Y.C. Jaycees, 512 F.2d at 859.
122. See, e.g., Big Sky D-I College Men’s CC (2015), USA ULTIMATE,
https://play.usaultimate.org/events/Big-Sky-D-I-College-Mens-CC-2015/FieldMap/
[https://perma.cc/Z9TZ-NCTC] (indicating that the tournament took place on both the
campus of Boise State University and local municipal parks).
123. See Gilmore v. Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 573–74 (1974); Magill v. Avonworth
Baseball Conference, 516 F.2d 1328, 1333 (3d Cir. 1975).
124. See generally Ponce v. Basketball Fed’n of P.R., 760 F.2d 375 (1st Cir. 1985)
(holding in a case alleging nationality discrimination that the Basketball Federation of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (“Federation”) did not act with state power when
declining to admit an American citizen based on eligibility rules). Much like USA
Ultimate, the Federation served as a private, nonprofit sporting organization that oversaw
and directed the play of a sport at an amateur level. See id. at 376. In the same way that
USA Ultimate, through WFDF, is a member of an Olympic Committee and represents the
United States on the international stage, the Federation represented Puerto Rico on the
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Furthermore, none of the aforementioned tests brings USA
Ultimate within the scope of state action. The nexus test fails in part
because there is not a sufficiently close connection between USA
Ultimate and the government. While USA Ultimate may have
received some form of federal funding in the past, such receipt fails to
create a close enough connection.125 In any event, USA Ultimate
appears not to have received federal funding in recent years.126 No
government entity is alleged to have used USA Ultimate as a proxy
actor or encouraged USA Ultimate’s actions. The symbiotic
relationship and joint action tests similarly fail due to a lack of
legitimate connections between the state and USA Ultimate; the two
simply cannot be said to have acted in concert due to the lack of a
clear dependency or decisionmaking relationship. Additionally,
because tournaments take place at various public facilities on an
irregular basis,127 no long-term relationship develops between USA
Ultimate and the government entities with which it interacts for
tournament purposes. Finally, USA Ultimate, in functioning only as
the governing entity of a sport, does not exercise powers traditionally
reserved to the state. This test is interpreted even more narrowly than
the others,128 and considering that USA Ultimate does not take on
responsibilities as distinctly governmental as running elections for
public officials or managing public parks, notwithstanding their use of
them, the exclusive function test must fail as well.129
Olympic and international level. See id. Despite the aesthetically meshed relationship
between the Federation and the Puerto Rican government, however, the First Circuit
determined that the relationship was merely symbolic and did not accord the Federation
state authority. Id. at 378. Considering the similarities between USA Ultimate and the
Federation, it appears that one could easily project a lack of state authority in USA
Ultimate’s actions.
125. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 384 n.3 (1978) (“This Court
has never held that the mere receipt of federal or state funds is sufficient to make the
recipient a federal or state actor.”).
126. See supra note 117–18 and accompanying text.
127. This lack of consistency results from the bid system for tournament locations,
whereby individual schools or groups apply to host tournaments; this system presides for
USA Ultimate postseason tournaments as well. See Tournament Sanctioning, USA
ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/resources/sanctioning/tournaments.aspx [https://perma.cc/
MGS3-CVMQ].
128. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (noting that the question in
this test is not whether the party performs a public function but “whether the function
performed has been traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State” (quoting Jackson
v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974))).
129. In assessing USA Ultimate’s potential governmental ties and the resulting
possible implications of state action, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court has
determined that the NCAA is not a state actor, despite its considerable ties to all fifty
state governments in the form of a substantial number of its constituent members being
state universities. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 182 (1988). By extension, USA
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Unless USA Ultimate has done or later will do something that
creates a closer nexus between itself and state authority, claims
undergirded by the First Amendment or other constitutional
provisions should not succeed. The Constitution is not the only
potential source of help for BYU CHI, however, so other sources of
law are worth assessing.
2. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states in part that “[a]ll
persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any
place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without
discrimination or segregation on the ground of . . . religion.”130 This
portion of the broadly sweeping and landscape-changing federal civil
rights legislation deals specifically with discrimination in places of
public accommodation.131 The scope here differs from constitutional
protections of the exercise of religion in that this law can encompass
completely private acts so long as they substantially interact with
interstate commerce.132 Courts must liberally construe Title II in
order to fulfill the clear purpose of the Act: to eradicate
discrimination in public places so that all citizens can have the full
enjoyment of public facilities.133 Specifically important to BYU CHI’s
case is the fact that the statute includes within its definition of “place
of public accommodation” spaces such as “sports arena[s], stadium[s]
or other place[s] of exhibition or entertainment.”134
Because Title II explicitly encompasses sports arenas and other
similar venues, the law appears at first blush to be a potential avenue
for BYU CHI to pursue its claim. Additionally, because BYU CHI’s
Ultimate’s tangential ties to state universities should not be considered enough to render
its actions “state action.” While the Supreme Court has decided that one athletic
governing body—“a statewide association incorporated to regulate interscholastic athletic
competition”—qualified as a state actor under the nexus test, USA Ultimate bears far
fewer connections to the state than did the entity at issue in that case. Brentwood Acad. v.
Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 290–93 (2001) (observing that the
association was largely funded by public schools, was led by public school representatives,
operated under the state’s approval, offered benefits through the state’s public retirement
system, and associated itself with the state in a number of other ways).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012).
131. Id.; see also Joel K. Goldstein, Constitutional Dialogue and the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1095, 1095 (2005) (expressing that the Civil Rights Act of 1964
was “a seminal legislative accomplishment of the twentieth century”).
132. See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 303–08 (1969) (ruling that a private recreational
facility fell within the scope of Title II because its snack bar interacted with interstate
commerce and the club anticipated entertaining people traveling in interstate commerce).
133. See id. at 306–08.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(3) (2012).

2019]

EVALUATING ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS

957

coach has alluded to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in discussing this
dispute publicly, the team appears to be aware that Title II may
apply.135 Indeed, the particular fact pattern adds new wrinkles to
already-addressed issues and even finds new ground for argument,
making this conflict especially interesting to analyze under the civil
rights legislation.
Generally, to state an actionable claim under Title II, a party
must allege that it
(1) is a member of a protected class; (2) attempted to exercise
the right to full benefits and enjoyment of a place of public
accommodations; (3) was denied those benefits and enjoyment;
and (4) was treated less favorably than similarly situated
persons who are not members of the protected class.136
Additionally, a Title II plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief if it can
show a “real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged
again.”137
At first glance, and based solely on the above test, BYU CHI
seems as though it could have an actionable claim. The team passes
the first element—a showing that it is a member of a protected class—
because it effectively is a religious group.138 Then, depending on
tournament venue, the team could pass the second element by
showing that it attempted to participate in a tournament that
occurred in a place of public accommodation. It should then be able
to pass the third element by showing that it was unable to fully
participate due to its religious beliefs. Finally, BYU CHI should pass
the final element by showing that other teams who were not part of
the protected religious class were able to compete for the full
weekend. Also, proving that the team is likely to suffer the same
harm again will not be problematic, considering the tournament
occurs yearly and the team has suffered this same fate for many years.
Yet the above test is not entirely straightforward as applied in
this case. For instance, does every single college postseason
tournament actually take place at a place of public accommodation?
135. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
136. Dunn v. Albertsons, No. 2:16-cv-02194-GMN-PAL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
127815, at *6 (D. Nev. Aug. 10, 2017) (citing United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 894
F.2d 83, 88 (3d Cir. 1990)).
137. Brooks v. Collis Foods, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1351 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (quoting
Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1007 (11th Cir. 1997)). Furthermore,
a plaintiff in a Title II claim is entitled only to injunctive relief, not money damages. See
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012) (prohibiting discrimination in any place of public
accommodation on the basis of “race, color, religion, or national origin”).
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Due to the relative complexity of the matter at issue, several other
factors must be analyzed to determine whether the alleged
discrimination by USA Ultimate would be actionable under Title II.
Those include the nexus between USA Ultimate’s actions and
interstate commerce; whether a postseason tournament qualifies as a
place of public accommodation; and USA Ultimate’s apparent lack of
discriminatory intent as a precipitating factor.
a.

Interstate Commerce

First, in order for Title II to apply, the location of the alleged
discrimination must be involved in interstate commerce in some
substantial way.139 That factor, which is separate from but interacts
with the four-element test above, can be met in several ways. For
instance, if the space offers items that have traveled in interstate
commerce, Title II will apply.140 In the case of sporting events, the
presence of participants who have traveled in interstate commerce
can also satisfy Title II’s interstate commerce requirement.141
Furthermore, substantial and regular attendance of patrons from outof-state can satisfy this requirement.142 As such, if an establishment or
place of entertainment like a sports venue customarily hosts
tournaments that feature goods, athletic teams, or patrons that have
moved in interstate commerce, then the establishment falls within the
scope of Title II.143
Additionally, Title II’s application extends to the whole of a
facility or establishment when one portion of it is determined to fall
within Title II’s reach.144 For instance, if an establishment’s snack bar
or lunch counter is covered under Title II because it offers goods that
have traveled in, have interacted with, or will affect interstate
commerce, then the entirety of the establishment becomes a place of
public accommodation within the meaning of Title II.145
139. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250–51 (1964).
140. See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 303–08 (1969).
141. United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. 785, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1989),
aff’d, 894 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1990). In a sports tournament context, courts have determined
that attendance of out-of-state teams and players at annual golf tournaments was enough
to bring the pertinent golf courses within the ambit of Title II. See Brown v. Loudoun Golf
& Country Club, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 399, 401–02 (E.D. Va. 1983); Evans v. Laurel Links,
Inc., 261 F. Supp. 474, 477 (E.D. Va. 1966) (holding that a golf course that hosted an outof-state team once a year was subject to Title II).
142. See, e.g., Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. at 792 (determining that a swim club’s out-ofstate guest rate of around ten percent over two years was significant and regular enough to
satisfy the commerce requirement).
143. Evans, 261 F. Supp. at 477.
144. Daniel, 395 U.S. at 305.
145. Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. at 795; Evans, 261 F. Supp. at 476.
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For the postseason tournaments that would be at issue in a
lawsuit between BYU CHI and USA Ultimate, this factor is satisfied
in every single case. At the very least, the Big Sky Conference
encompasses colleges and universities from four states. Thus,
whenever the Conference Championship Tournament occurs, teams
travel interstate in order to reach the tournament. That fact satisfies
the interstate participant analysis. Furthermore, apparel vendors or
tournament directors often sell merchandise that likely would have
traveled through interstate commerce. Finally, many tournaments are
held at parks with some form of food and beverage stand. As with
those food stands at issue in several seminal cases like United States v.
Lansdowne Swim Club,146 a food bar at an ultimate tournament likely
would offer food and beverages that traveled in interstate commerce.
By extension, the designation of the food bar as a public
accommodation would bring the entire sports complex hosting the
ultimate tournament into Title II’s scope. Invariably, the interstate
commerce test would be met at a college postseason ultimate
tournament.
b.

Place of Public Accommodation

The next issue is determining whether the postseason
tournaments are places of public accommodation—the second of the
four elements in the Title II test. In order to prove that the
tournaments are places of public accommodation, BYU CHI would
need to satisfy the “place” or “situs” requirement. Included within
“public accommodations” are places of entertainment, which
generally encompass establishments where the entertainment
materializes with the direct participation in an activity or a sport.147 In
other words, the “sports arena” and “stadium” included in the
language of Title II serve as places of accommodation both for the
spectators and for the participants.148 Courts have reached this
146. 713 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aff’d, 894 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1990).
147. Daniel, 395 U.S. at 306–08. Even under stricter articulations of the “place of
entertainment” test, an ultimate tournament should qualify because its primary purpose is
to provide entertainment for those participating and potentially for spectators as well. See
Michael F. Roessler, Recent Development, We Are Not Amused: The Narrow
Interpretation of Title II’s Place-of-Entertainment Provision in Denny v. Elizabeth Arden
Salons, Inc., 85 N.C. L. REV. 1259, 1269–70 (2007) (discussing the “primary-purpose test”
used in the Fourth Circuit, which requires that an establishment’s primary purpose be to
entertain in order to be considered a place of entertainment under Title II).
148. Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. at 790–91. The Supreme Court noted that this finding
comports with the generally accepted meaning of “entertainment” and accords with Title
II’s aim of “remov[ing] the daily affront and humiliation involved in discriminatory denials
of access to facilities ostensibly open to the general public.” Daniel, 395 U.S. at 307–08; see
also Evans, 261 F. Supp. at 477 (determining that plaintiffs suing for access to a whites-
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conclusion in the context of several sports, including golf149 and
football.150
Under the clear meaning of “place,” the tournaments should
satisfy the situs requirement. Generally, the tournaments take place
at either public fields—whether owned by a university or
municipality—or private athletic fields. Either way, the tournaments
qualify as places of entertainment because both spectators and
competitors are invited to enter or participate, and the tournaments
take place at venues that are explicitly included within the language
of Title II. Thus, in terms of the plain language of the statute, the
tournaments constitute Title II places of public accommodation.
Other issues remain, however. Namely, because USA Ultimate
would be the likely defendant in a Title II lawsuit, assessing how that
organization interacts with the place of public accommodation
requirement could be pivotal. Thus, this Comment analyzes whether
USA Ultimate is itself a place of public accommodation and whether
it becomes more closely tied to the situs as a lessee.
i. USA Ultimate: The Organization as a Place of Public
Accommodation
Under current case law, USA Ultimate as an organization does
not qualify as a Title II place of public accommodation. Although the
organization does not fall within the express statutory exception for
“private clubs,” its similarity to other organizations that have been
deemed not to fall within the ambit of Title II should prevent its
application in this case.
First, Title II explicitly places certain private establishments
outside its reach. Specifically, Title II does not apply to private clubs
“not in fact open to the public.”151 As a result, if an organization or
business is determined to be a private club, then it may discriminate
without fear of repercussion under Title II. Because the statute itself
does not clearly define what a private club is,152 courts have identified
several factors to evaluate in determining whether a club is private,
including the selectivity of the organization’s membership; the
membership’s management, ownership, or control over the club’s
only golf club “[were] not limited to watching golf matches” but could “play golf on the
defendant’s course on the same basis as white customers” (emphasis added)).
149. Brown v. Loudoun Golf & Country Club, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 399, 402 (E.D. Va.
1983).
150. United States v. Slidell Youth Football Ass’n, 387 F. Supp. 474, 482–83 (E.D. La.
1974).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (2012).
152. Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. at 796.
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operations; the club’s history; whether nonmembers have access to or
use the club’s facilities; the purpose of the club’s existence; whether
the club publicly recruits or advertises for members; whether the club
is for-profit or nonprofit; and whether the club has implemented
formalities such as having bylaws, meetings, and membership cards.153
For example, in an early Title II case, an Alabama YMCA
claimed that it qualified as a private club and thus could not be forced
to comply with the anti-discrimination law.154 The Fifth Circuit
rejected the YMCA’s argument.155 The court observed that the
YMCA’s membership policies were too unselective; it lacked
attributes of member ownership associated with private clubs; it
generated substantial revenue from public agencies; it provided many
recreational programs to the general public; and it operated as a
quasi-public agency.156 Assessing these aggregate factors, the court
determined that the YMCA was not a private club and was thus
subject to Title II as a place of public accommodation.157
Similarly, USA Ultimate should not qualify as a private club.
First, the organization is not selective in its membership. It actively
solicits members—indeed, it exists to grow the sport by recruiting
members—and the threshold for membership is signing up and paying
to be a member.158 Although USA Ultimate members provide
feedback,159 and most of the staff are members,160 there is a clear and
narrow organizational leadership structure that does not incorporate
the opinions of its many individual members.161 The organization is a
nonprofit corporation;162 it has established various corporate features

153. Id. at 796–97.
154. Smith v. YMCA of Montgomery, Inc., 462 F.2d 634, 642 (5th Cir. 1972).
155. Id. at 648–49.
156. Id. at 642, 648–49.
157. Id. at 649.
158. See Membership Overview, USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/
membership/ [https://perma.cc/VN8V-FKUF].
159. See Members’ Impact, USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/
membershipimpact/ [https://perma.cc/85ZJ-HZK9] (stating that “members’ . . . feedback
. . . [is] important to USA Ultimate”).
160. See Contact Us: USA Ultimate Headquarters Staff, USA ULTIMATE,
https://www.usaultimate.org/about/contact_us/hq_staff.aspx#leej [https://perma.cc/52EDBBKM] (providing the biographies of staff members, many of whom previously played the
sport and were otherwise associated with USA Ultimate).
161. See Board of Directors, USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/
about/contact_us/board_of_directors.aspx [https://perma.cc/G42E-5HM6]; Contact Us:
USA Ultimate Headquarters Staff, supra note 160.
162. About, USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/about_us/ [https://perma.cc/
K32A-U6XA].
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like bylaws;163 and members wield membership cards.164 Although
some facts—like the membership cards—push lightly in favor of
deeming USA Ultimate a private club, the organization should not be
so considered. USA Ultimate, similar to the YMCA in Smith v.
YMCA of Montgomery, Inc.,165 is a large organization that solicits and
welcomes all types of members and has low hurdles for admission. By
almost any measure, USA Ultimate is not a private club and is
therefore not exempt from Title II for that particular reason.
While USA Ultimate most likely is not exempt as a private club,
other features of the organization arguably take the organization
outside the scope of Title II. Recent litigation dealing with the Boy
Scouts of America’s (“BSA”) refusal to allow prospective boy scouts
or adult scout leaders to join the organization due to internal policies
indicates that an organization’s lack of concrete association to
particular locations can bring the organization outside the scope of
Title II.
In Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America,166 for instance, a son and
father sued the BSA and a local BSA council under Title II for
admission to a troop after they were refused entry due to their
atheism.167 The plaintiffs contended that the BSA constituted a place
of public accommodation because the active, fun, and recreational
nature of the organization rendered it a place of entertainment.168 The
BSA argued that it was not a “place” subject to Title II but merely an
organization that facilitated scouting activities.169 Early in its analysis,
the court noted that the BSA is a membership organization whose
activities did not center around a specific facility or place and that
“membership in [the BSA] does not provide access to a particular
facility.”170 It then moved on to determine whether “place” should be
construed in its literal connotation as a “physical site” or if this was
merely a term of convenience that would allow for inclusion of
accommodations that do not have a specific location or facility.171 It

163. See generally USA Ultimate Bylaws, USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/
bylaws/ [https://perma.cc/WL8N-CY2R] (providing the USA Ultimate bylaws).
164. USA ULTIMATE, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 18 (2013), https://www.usaultimate.org/
assets/1/Page/USA%20Ultimate%20Annual%20Report%202013_FINAL_lowres.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F8U2-GQ3M] (“All members receive a membership card . . . .”).
165. 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972).
166. 787 F. Supp. 1511 (N.D. Ill. 1992), aff’d, 933 F. 2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993).
167. Id. at 1512. The BSA requires its members to “subscribe to a duty to God.” Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1512–13.
170. Id. at 1521.
171. Id. at 1522.
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noted that this question was novel in the Title II context but that it
had been addressed in similarly worded state laws.172
Ultimately, the Welsh court declined to extend “place” status to
the BSA within the context of Title II because the BSA lacked the
commensurate ties to a particular facility of the kind contemplated in
Title II.173 In its analysis, the court noted a range of interpretations of
the term “place,” spanning from strict adherence to its physical
connotation to a conclusion that “a membership organization need
not be a ‘place’ in order to come within the reach of a statute like
Title II, so long as its activities center upon an identifiable
location.”174 The Welsh court considered “place” to be inextricably
tied to “the concept of a physical site” under Title II.175 The court
pointed to membership organizations, like youth sports associations,
that would fall within the scope of Title II, but only in the context of
the organization owning its own facilities and discriminatorily
refusing entry to particular protected parties.176 In contrast, the BSA
“lack[ed] a connection to a particular site or facility” and thus failed
to qualify as a “place” under Title II.177 In the end, the court
concluded that, “[i]n order to qualify as a ‘place of public
accommodation’ within the scope of Title II, an establishment must
have a substantial connection to a concrete facility or location,” which
means that membership organizations that “do not operate from or
supply access to a particular facility or location” are not within the
scope of Title II.178 The Seventh Circuit affirmed.179
172. Id. at 1522–23.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1528; see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656–57 (2000)
(observing that in some states, the definition of “public accommodation” had extended
from “clearly commercial entities” to “membership organizations such as the Boy
Scouts”); Brounstein v. Am. Cat Fanciers Ass’n, 839 F. Supp. 1100, 1107 (D.N.J. 1993)
(observing that the New Jersey state anti-discrimination law did not require “place” to be
a fixed location).
175. Welsh, 787 F. Supp. at 1530.
176. Id. at 1531.
177. Id. at 1538. The court also noted that, although the BSA has administrative offices
and meets at certain sponsored locations like churches and schools, access to the physical
locations was not at issue; membership to the organization was at issue. Id. at 1538–39.
Furthermore, the court feared the constitutional implications of considering organizations
with any semblance of a physical meeting point to be open to everyone under Title II. Id.
at 1539.
178. Id. at 1541. Also, “where the benefits of membership in an organization flow
primarily, if not exclusively, from the interpersonal association among the people who
belong to the organization rather than the enjoyment of the physical accoutrements of a
particular facility,” then Title II does not reach the organization itself. Id. at 1540.
179. Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1268 (7th Cir. 1993). Welsh has not
received universal approbation. Compare Edward Bigham, Recent Decision, Civil
Rights—Seventh Circuit Permits Boy Scouts of America to Exclude Atheist, 67 TEMP. L.
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Given the Welsh court’s analysis, USA Ultimate compares
favorably with the BSA. USA Ultimate is an organization that
facilitates recreational activities across the United States. Due to the
nature of how its tournaments are held, however, its spatial ties are
fluid. Individual teams or groups apply to host tournaments, and USA
Ultimate merely sanctions them.180 Unlike the sports leagues that
actually own the spaces at issue in some Title II cases,181 or the
YMCA discussed above,182 USA Ultimate does not actually own the
spaces at which most of its activities are held.183 Indeed, in this regard,
USA Ultimate and the BSA are quite similar. The analogy between
the two organizations in this legal context is limited, of course, by the
type of controversy at hand in each case. In Welsh, the issue is
membership in the organization, whereas in the present conflict, the
issue is BYU CHI’s ability to compete meaningfully in USA
Ultimate’s college postseason. BYU CHI and its players are members
of USA Ultimate, so the access to the organization is not at issue. In
terms of Title II, however, it is important to note that the location,
not the organization itself, is the linchpin for a lawsuit because being
able to sue USA Ultimate as a place of public accommodation could
grant BYU CHI great latitude to choose a forum for its lawsuit.
ii. Lessee Issue
Lastly, there is another spatial issue: USA Ultimate does not
directly own or operate the facilities where tournaments take place.
As such, the relationship between USA Ultimate as the allegedly
discriminatory party and the locations and establishments of the
tournaments where the alleged discrimination occurs is tenuous and
creates ambiguity for Title II application. This issue is novel in the
context of Title II. Most cases have dealt with businesses or entities

REV. 1333, 1345–49 (1994) (criticizing the courts’ conclusions that the BSA does not
qualify as a place of public accommodation), with Patrick J. Poff, Case Note, Welsh v. Boy
Scouts of America: Defining the Scope of a “Place of Public Accommodation” Under Title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1137, 1141–44 (1994) (commending
the Welsh court’s conclusions of law).
180. See Tournament Sanctioning, supra note 127.
181. See, e.g., United States v. Slidell Youth Football Ass’n, 387 F. Supp. 474, 477 (E.D.
La. 1974).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 154–57.
183. Since it does not have facilities to offer, USA Ultimate relies on its “sanctioning
program . . . to encourage and support the growth of Ultimate at all levels” by facilitating
opportunities for players and legitimizing playing the sport. USA Ultimate Sanctioning,
USA
ULTIMATE,
https://www.usaultimate.org/resources/sanctioning/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/NZ9C-Q62M].
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operating in a static location, such as a motel.184 In this case, however,
USA Ultimate is not the owner of particular fields at which the
tournaments occur. Instead, individual schools or teams apply to host
the tournament, and USA Ultimate simply facilitates the tournament
at that location.185 The issue becomes, then, whether the ephemeral
nature of the tournament locations from year to year prevents the site
from falling within the scope of Title II.
One particularly relevant example for this issue is Wesley v. City
of Savannah,186 which involved a private organization’s annual use of
a municipal golf course for a local golf tournament.187 The private golf
association that organized the tournament limited its membership and
special event eligibility to Caucasians.188 The organization owned no
golf course of its own and primarily used public courses for its
events.189 Black golfers who were refused entry to the tournament
sued under Title II, claiming that the private club’s use of a municipal
golf course implicated the government enough to bring the
tournament within Title II’s reach.190 While the private organization
conceded that the city’s golf course was a place of public
accommodation, it argued that it was merely a third-party customer
using the course and that Title II should not reach into such lessee
relationships.191 The court determined that “[s]tate action may take
the form of allowing private organizations to use public facilities” and
that, while the city was not actively subsidizing the club’s use of its
golf course, the mere leasing of the course constituted enough
governmental action to qualify as state involvement sufficient to
implicate Title II.192 Factors such as the clear association with the city
government, the annual use of public resources by the private
organization, and the coining of the tournament as the “City Amateur
Championship” helped lead the court to its determination.193
Additionally, analogous cases involving the NCAA have
occurred in a similar public accommodations context: Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”). Since Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title III of the ADA have
184. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261–62
(1964) (forcing a motel to open up to black patrons).
185. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
186. 294 F. Supp. 698 (S.D. Ga. 1969).
187. Id. at 699.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 702–03.
190. Id. at 700.
191. Id. at 701–02.
192. Id. at 702.
193. Id. at 702–03.
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comparable public accommodations provisions, decisions rendered
under either statute can provide instructive analysis for the other.194
In those cases, courts recognized the difference between analyzing
“organizations as organizations” in the public accommodations
context and organizations “as the operators of facilities that might, in
turn be considered places of public accommodation.”195 In those
cases, courts analyzed whether the NCAA had close enough
connections with particular facilities to be deemed, as an
organization, a place of public accommodation.196 For example, in
Ganden v. NCAA,197 the court, in considering a motion for
preliminary injunction, found that the plaintiff had a “reasonable
likelihood of demonstrating” that the NCAA qualified as a place of
public accommodation because it exerted a certain amount of control
over and was closely connected to the athletic facilities of its member
institutions.198 That analysis relied on whether the organization was
affiliated with a particular facility and whether one needed to be a
member of or affiliated with the organization in order to use that
facility.199 The court found that it was reasonably likely that the
NCAA operated a university’s facilities and was sufficiently closely
connected to qualify as a place of public accommodation.200
Much like the golf organization in Wesley, USA Ultimate does
not own the athletic venues, arenas, and fields where its tournaments
take place. This attenuated connection to the ultimate tournament
facilities contrasts USA Ultimate against the NCAA, which has
member institutions and bears a much closer relationship to the
physical locations that act as places of public accommodation. And
moving further away from the Wesley golf club example, USA
Ultimate does not even directly lease out space for most of the
postseason tournaments potentially at issue in this particular conflict.
Instead, individual teams or groups apply to host, and these parties
find the particular tournament sites. USA Ultimate merely facilitates
the tournaments. Wesley’s application is therefore suspect, and the
194. See Tatum v. NCAA, 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1121 (E.D. Mo. 1998). Borrowing from
the ADA for this analysis is limited to assessing whether leasing a certain space would
qualify an organization as a place of public accommodation. The comparison does not
extend to evaluating whether discrimination has occurred in a place of public
accommodation.
195. See, e.g., id.
196. See, e.g., id. at 1119, 1121.
197. No. 96 C 6953, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
198. Id. at *29–30.
199. Id. at *33–34.
200. Id. at *34; see also Tatum, 992 F. Supp. at 1121 (finding that the NCAA “operates
a place of public accommodation” in part because of “[t]he significant degree of control
that [it] exerts over the athletic facilities of its member institutions”).
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NCAA cases do not provide strong purchase. The Wesley court,
however, clearly determined that third parties who lease and operate
places of public accommodation may not discriminate in a manner
that violates Title II. Arguably, those who run USA Ultimate
postseason tournaments are doing so either under the auspices of
USA Ultimate or are USA Ultimate’s agents in facilitating the
postseason. Although there is a layer of separation that was not
present in Wesley, courts should be able to find that USA Ultimate is
implicated enough in the public accommodation spaces to bring them
in as a party to a lawsuit. Due to the nebulous nature of the law on
this point, along with USA Ultimate’s fluid and sporadic relationship
with the various tournament locations from year to year, both sides
could have ample room to argue their cases.
c.

Intent

The final and certainly most fatal issue is one of intent. In order
for Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to apply, a defendant must
have intentionally discriminated against a party in a protected class.201
Actions that incidentally affect a particular religious group generally
do not fall within the scope of Title II.202 If an establishment or
organization “has set up facially neutral regulations governing the
provision of its services, with no indication of discriminatory motive
or intent,” then there is no claim under Title II.203 Furthermore, if the
organization
establishes
“a
legitimate,
non-discriminatory
justification” for its policy, then it has asserted enough to stave off a
Title II claim.204

201. Generally, Title II claims must “allege intentional discrimination.” Jalal v. Lucille
Roberts Health Clubs Inc., 254 F. Supp. 3d 602, 607 (S.D.N.Y.) (quoting James v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 247 F. Supp. 3d 297, 305 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)), vacated as moot, No. 17-1936,
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18798 (2d Cir. 2017). Additionally, Title II claims must “plead
‘facts which demonstrate discriminatory intent’ . . . .” Id. (quoting Coward v. Town & Vill.
of Harrison, 665 F. Supp. 2d 281, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)). Furthermore, Title II does not
necessarily target private actions that have unintended discriminatory effects. See id.
“[I]ntent to discriminate [as] the animating element of a Title II claim” is necessary “given
the fact that religious beliefs are subjective and personal, [and] practically any rule created
by a public accommodation could adversely affect an individual or one group of people.”
Id. at 608; see also Akiyama v. U.S. Judo Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1184–85 (W.D. Wash.
2002) (determining that, for “allegations of religious discrimination, intent must be an
element of the claim,” and commenting that “[v]irtually any restriction or regulation
imposed by a public accommodation could impinge on a person’s religious beliefs . . .
whether it be by conducting business only on Sundays, by failing to keep a Kosher kitchen,
[or] by failing to include fish on the menu during Lent”).
202. See Akiyama, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1184–85.
203. Id. at 1187.
204. Id.
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Boyle v. Jerome Country Club,205 for instance, dealt with a fact
pattern similar to the one present in the USA Ultimate conflict. The
defendant country club hosted golf tournaments that took place
exclusively on weekends.206 The plaintiff, a Mormon, was unable to
play in the tournaments due to his religious abstention of playing on
Sundays.207 After the defendant refused to make scheduling
accommodations, the plaintiff sued under Title II, claiming that the
tournament format and the defendant’s refusal to change it
constituted religious discrimination.208 The plaintiff also asserted that
the defendant had a duty to accommodate his religious beliefs.209
The court preliminarily observed that the plaintiff’s religious
beliefs were sincere,210 the defendant had never refused to permit the
plaintiff entry to the course or tournament,211 the golf course was in
fact a public accommodation,212 other Mormon members had played
in the tournament,213 and no Mormon had requested a change in the
schedule in the past.214 Additionally, the court paid particular
attention to the defendant’s stated reasons for refusing to change the
tournament schedule. These included a desire to avoid negatively
affecting other players; “open[ing] the door to allow every participant
in the tournament to make special requests”; and various staffing,
logistical, and economic issues that would accompany such an
accommodation.215
Because the parties to the case agreed that the golf course was a
public accommodation, the court proceeded to analyze “legal issues
on which precious little precedent exists,” including who bears the
burden of proof and the level of scienter required in Title II cases.216
Following authority from the Seventh Circuit, the court used a
burden-shifting analysis.217 Under that test, a “[p]laintiff has the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case of improper discrimination,”
which can be met with minimal proof.218 If a plaintiff establishes a

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

883 F. Supp. 1422 (D. Idaho 1995).
Id. at 1424.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1425.
Id.
Id. at 1429.
Id. at 1429–30.
Id. at 1430.
Id.
Id. at 1429.
Id.
Id. (citing Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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prima facie case, then the court presumes unlawful discrimination.219
“The burden then shifts to the defendant ‘who must offer evidence
that the adverse action was taken for other than impermissibly
discriminatory reasons.’”220 If a defendant gives proof of “legitimate
reasons” for its action, then “the presumptions created by the prima
facie case” in favor of a plaintiff “disappear.”221 Finally, the burden
shifts back to a plaintiff, who must show that the defendant’s
proffered reasons are mere “pretext for another motive which is
discriminatory.”222
In this case, the court found that the plaintiff established a prima
facie case because he provided sufficient evidence that the
tournament’s Sunday games prevented him from fully and equally
enjoying the public accommodation’s benefits.223 The burden then
shifted to the defendant, which provided evidence that Mormons had
played in the tournament in the past and that allowing this
accommodation to the schedule would create logistical and financial
burdens on the defendant.224 The court determined that the defendant
“presented substantial evidence that it has legitimate business
reasons, completely unrelated to religious considerations, for
scheduling its final round of play on Sunday.”225 Finally, the plaintiff
had an opportunity to show that the defendant’s reasons were
pretextual.226 While the plaintiff attempted to show that altering the
schedule would not create a great burden for the defendant or undue
benefit for the plaintiff, he failed to do what the court asked: to show
that the defendant’s given reason for not changing its schedule was
pretextual.227 The plaintiff thus failed to carry his burden, and the
court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.228
Ultimately the defendant’s clear and substantial evidence of its
business reasons for refusing to accommodate the plaintiff—which
were unrelated to religious considerations—and a lack of evidence
that the club showed any animus towards the plaintiff on religious
grounds convinced the court to grant the defendant summary
judgment on the Title II claim.229 Essentially, the court held that, if a
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id.
Id. (quoting Wallis, 26 F.3d at 889).
Id. (quoting Wallis, 26 F.3d at 892).
Id. (quoting Wallis, 26 F.3d at 889).
Id.
Id. at 1429–30.
Id. at 1430.
Id.
Id. at 1430–31.
Id. at 1431–33.
Id. at 1430–33.
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defendant has clear and legitimate business or operational reasons for
refusing to accommodate, and there is no clear pretextual religious
discrimination, then the defendant is not obligated to accommodate
religious preferences for incidentally discriminatory effects of the
organization’s policy.230
Here, USA Ultimate clearly did not establish the weekend
tournament format to intentionally discriminate against BYU CHI
for its adherence to a Sunday-play prohibition. Instead, the weekend
tournament format developed over many years by necessity. Ultimate
is a sport that is still largely played on the amateur level, and
weekends are the most efficient time to schedule the necessary
number of games for a full tournament and to have enough games for
college rankings. Unlike many NCAA athletes, those who play
ultimate often are unable to make multiple trips to play games or to
miss classes. The weekend tournament is the best way to meet the
various needs of most student-athletes, and changing the schedule to
abandon Sunday play would create great inconveniences for the vast
majority of players. Additionally, making concessions here means
that USA Ultimate could lead to having to make similar concessions
for schools that have prohibitions on playing on other days. Although
Title II covers places of public accommodation, it does not require a
sports organization to accommodate members of protected classes by
changing schedules if its refusal is not intentionally discriminatory and
it has legitimate business, logistical, or other reasons to refuse.
Since BYU CHI does not have options for recourse under the
Constitution and federal statutory law, it will need to succeed in
showing that USA Ultimate has unlawfully discriminated against
BYU CHI under state anti-discrimination laws by refusing to
accommodate the team’s scheduling needs.
3. State Options
Beyond the realm of federal law, individual states have
implemented their own anti-discrimination legislation, and
prohibitions on religious discrimination in places of public
accommodation are universally present.231 While federal law sets a de
230. Id. at 1432.
231. See, e.g., Michelle L. Carusone, Comment, Dale v. Boy Scouts of America and
Monmouth Council: New Jersey’s Attempt to Define Places of Public Accommodation and
Remedy the “Cancer of Discrimination,” 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 823, 827 n.22 (2000) (listing
the state anti-discrimination statutes and noting that they all prohibit religious
discrimination). For this section’s state statutory analysis, this Comment will assume that
ultimate tournaments qualify as places of public accommodation because the statutes
broadly define the term “public accommodation.” See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2101(20)(a) (Westlaw through chapters effective, Apr. 3, 2019 sess.) (defining “public
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facto minimum standard of anti-discrimination for this type of
legislation,232 states can opt to provide further protections and
establish more rigid policies against discrimination.233 As such, state
laws may provide a party that allegedly has suffered from
discrimination further opportunity to seek redress.
Although BYU CHI hopes to resolve this conflict in a manner
that allows them to attend the National Championship Tournament,
which could be located in any given state in any given season, a state
law claim likely would need to be brought where the initial harm
occurred. In this case, because the team would effectively be
penalized for forfeiting its Sunday games in the first round of the
postseason, the harm would have to occur at the conference
championships, which BYU CHI would play in Montana,
Washington, Utah, or Idaho. As such, this section will review state
anti-discrimination laws in these states.234
As a preliminary matter, of the states discussed below, Montana,
Washington, and Idaho have statutorily established administrative
commissions that adjudicate complaints alleging discrimination.235 In
some cases, the complaints must first be brought to the applicable
administrative agency before the parties can resort to the state’s
judiciary.236 In those states, courts do not have jurisdiction over these
cases until all remedies are exhausted at the administrative level.237
accommodation” as “a place that caters or offers its services, goods, or facilities to the
general public subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and
applicable to all persons” and providing an explicitly noncomprehensive list of examples
of places of public accommodation).
232. This is a de facto minimum standard because federal law is plenary. See Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551–52 (1974).
233. States can generally provide laws that are more protective than federal laws. See,
e.g., Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409, 1423–24 (9th Cir. 1990)
(upholding a California maritime overtime pay law more generous than applicable federal
statutes).
234. Alberta, also a geopolitical unit that is included in the Big Sky Conference, will be
ignored for the purposes of this analysis because it is a Canadian province that likely will
not serve as a viable venue for BYU CHI.
235. See IDAHO CODE § 67-5903 (LEXIS through Chapter 197 of 2019 Reg. Sess.)
(establishing the Idaho commission on human rights); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-1706
(Westlaw through chapters effective, Apr. 3, 2019 sess.) (creating the state’s commission
for human rights); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.050 (Westlaw through Chapter 9 of
2019 Reg. Sess.) (creating the Washington state human rights commission). Plaintiffs in
Utah, on the other hand, can resort to the state’s court system straightaway. See UTAH
CODE ANN. § 13-7-4(3) (LEXIS through 2018 3d Spec. Sess.) (establishing that anyone
who is discriminated against “shall have a civil action for damages and any other remedy
available in law or equity against any person who” discriminates against him).
236. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-512 (Westlaw through chapters effective, Apr. 3,
2019 sess.).
237. See, e.g., Jones v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 2007 MT 82, ¶ 39, 337 Mont. 1, 155 P.3d 1247
(ruling that the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies by failing to file a
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Some states, though, allow for one to choose whether to pursue the
administrative route or the judicial route.238
a.

Montana

Under the Montana Human Rights Act (the “MHRA”),
it is . . . unlawful . . . for the owner, lessee, manager, agent, or
employee of a public accommodation:
(a) to refuse, withhold from, or deny to a person any of its
services, goods, facilities, advantages, or privileges because of
. . . creed [or] religion . . . ;
(b) to publish, circulate, issue, display, post, or mail a written or
printed communication, notice, or advertisement which states
or implies that any of the services, goods, facilities, advantages,
or privileges of the public accommodation will be refused,
withheld from, or denied to a person of a certain . . . creed [or]
religion . . . .239
The MHRA provides a reasonableness exception, however, that
allows such proprietors to distinguish persons “on reasonable
grounds.”240
Before plaintiffs241 can resort to the court system, they must first
bring their complaint to the Montana Human Rights Commission
(“Montana Commission”).242 This administrative body has the power
to enjoin a party from future discriminatory practices, and it has the
discretion to award reasonable monetary damages.243 After the

complaint with the Montana Human Rights Commission precluded the plaintiff from
bringing a viable claim in the trial court).
238. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.020 (Westlaw through Chapter 9 of
2019 Reg. Sess.).
239. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-304(1) (Westlaw through chapters effective, Apr. 3,
2019 sess.).
240. Id. No cases have construed “reasonable grounds” in the context of public
accommodations discrimination.
241. Under the MHRA, a plaintiff must distinguish herself as an “aggrieved party,” or
“someone ‘who can demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest, as distinguished
from a general interest, and who has been or is likely to be specially and injuriously
affected’ by a violation of the Act.” Baxter Homeowners Ass’n v. Angel, 2013 MT 83,
¶ 16, 369 Mont. 398, 298 P.3d 1145 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101(2) (Westlaw
through chapters effective, Apr. 3, 2019 sess.)).
242. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-205 (Westlaw through chapters effective, Apr. 3, 2019
sess.); id. § 49-2-501.
243. Id. § 49-2-506(1); see also Vainio v. Brookshire, 852 P.2d 596, 601 (Mont. 1993)
(determining that the Montana Commission may award reasonable damages).
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Montana Commission has issued a decision, the losing party may
commence a civil action in trial court.244
Additionally, the Montana Commission has the power to “adopt
procedural and substantive rules necessary to implement the
commission’s responsibilities” under the MHRA.245 Using this
authority, the Montana Commission has adopted several substantive
rules to guide its adjudication of claims of discrimination. For
instance, the Montana Commission has established that it will
construe the MHRA “liberally . . . with a view to effect [its] objects
and to promote justice.”246 The same rule, however, allows the
Montana Commission to decline finding discrimination where “strict
adherence” to its rule of construing the statute liberally “would cause
undue hardship or create a substantial injustice to a party.”247
Furthermore, the Montana Commission has adopted rules
specific to discrimination in places of public accommodation. For
instance, it has established that public accommodation discrimination
may include “imposing or applying qualification standards . . . that
screen out or tend to screen out a person or persons who are
members of a protected class unless the . . . selection criteria can be
shown to be necessary” for the place of public accommodation.248 The
Montana Commission has also created rules allowing plaintiffs to
prove discrimination under either of two tests: (1) the disparate
treatment test249 or (2) the disparate impact test.250
Under the disparate treatment test, a plaintiff must first establish
a prima facie case with evidence supporting an inference that the
244. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-512(3) (Westlaw through chapters effective, Apr. 3,
2019 sess.); see also Griffith v. Butte Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2010 MT 245, ¶¶ 36–39, 358 Mont.
193, 244 P.3d 321 (holding that a party may take a discrimination case to district court for
a trial on the merits once the Montana Commission has reached a decision).
245. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-204(1) (Westlaw through chapters effective, Apr. 3,
2019 sess.).
246. MONT. ADMIN. R. 24.9.104(2) (Westlaw through Issue 5 of 2019 Mont. Admin.
Register). The rule further states that “[a] principle objective of the [MHRA] is to assure
that there will be no discrimination in certain areas of the lives of Montana citizens, except
under the most limited of circumstances.” Id. Indeed, this administrative rule tracks with
the MHRA itself, which establishes a broad policy against discrimination in places of
public accommodation. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-1-102(1) (Westlaw through chapters
effective, Apr. 3, 2019 sess.) (establishing a “right to be free from discrimination because
of . . . religion,” which includes “the right to the full enjoyment of any” places of public
accommodation); see also Edwards v. Cascade Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 2009 MT 451, ¶ 62, 354
Mont. 307, 223 P.3d 893 (asserting that the MHRA establishes a state “non-discrimination
policy”).
247. MONT. ADMIN. R. 24.9.104(6) (Westlaw through Issue 5 of 2019 Mont. Admin.
Register).
248. Id. R. 24.9.609(2)(a).
249. Id. R. 24.9.610.
250. Id. R. 24.9.612.
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allegedly discriminating party considered a plaintiff’s membership in
a protected class when engaging in its allegedly discriminatory act.251
In order to establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff generally must
show that: (1) it is a member of a protected class, (2) it sought an
opportunity that the defendant made available, and (3) it was denied
the opportunity under “circumstances raising a reasonable inference
that [a plaintiff] was treated differently because of membership in a
protected class.”252 If a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie
case of unlawful discrimination, then the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant who “must produce evidence of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.”253 If a defendant
produces such evidence, then a plaintiff “must demonstrate that the
reason offered by the [defendant] is a pretext for unlawful
discrimination,” for instance, by showing that the defendant’s “acts
were more likely based on an unlawful motive” or that the
defendant’s explanation is not believable.254
Under the disparate treatment test, BYU CHI may be able to
establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. The team can
easily show that it is a member of a protected class and that it sought
an opportunity that USA Ultimate made available to it. While the
third prong might present some interpretive difficulties,255 the
Montana Commission’s policy of construing the statutory language
and rules broadly could help BYU CHI establish a prima facie case.
At that point, USA Ultimate has the opportunity to rebut by offering
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to change its
tournament schedule. The argument is straightforward: the
251. Id. R. 24.9.610(2).
252. Id. R. 24.9.610(2)(a).
253. Id. R. 24.9.610(3).
254. Id. R. 24.9.610(4). Furthermore, if the plaintiff “establishe[s] a prima facie case
with direct evidence of unlawful discrimination,” then the defendant “must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that an unlawful motive played no role in the challenged
action or that the direct evidence of discrimination is not credible and is unworthy of
belief.” Id. R. 24.9.610(5).
255. To some extent, that third prong appears to be satisfied—BYU CHI does not
have the opportunity to advance in the postseason like most other teams because the
tournament format requires competition on the team’s religious day of rest. Such a wide
construction of that rule, however, may misconstrue the rule’s intent. After all, the
requirement that the plaintiff must raise a reasonable inference of discrimination because
of disparate treatment based on membership in a protected class strongly implies that the
defendant’s reason for distinguishing must be focused on the plaintiff’s membership in the
protected class. Here, USA Ultimate does not appear to be distinguishing because BYU
CHI is a team of Mormons. Instead, USA Ultimate is distinguishing because BYU CHI
does not play on Sundays when postseason tournaments’ qualifying games occur. That
BYU CHI does not play on Sundays because it adheres to rules stemming from its
membership in a protected class may or may not be a close enough link to USA Ultimate’s
reason for distinguishing to satisfy the third prong of the prima facie test.
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tournaments have always operated this way in order to accommodate
college-athletes’ schedules and to fit in the appropriate number of
games. BYU CHI would then have to show that USA Ultimate’s
reason is simply pretext for unlawful discrimination, which is an
implausible argument given that the sport’s long tradition of weekend
tournaments was ingrained well before BYU CHI became a
nationally relevant team.
The Montana Commission has also adopted the disparate impact
test, which allows a plaintiff to prove discrimination by showing that a
defendant’s actions adversely affected that plaintiff’s protected
class.256 As with the disparate treatment test, the disparate impact test
requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of unlawful
discrimination.257 To establish a prima facie case under this test, the
plaintiff must prove “that one or more identified practices or policies
of [a defendant] have a significant or substantial adverse effect on the
charging party’s protected class.”258 Under this test, the plaintiff does
not need to provide evidence of the defendant’s intent to
discriminate.259 If the plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie
case of unlawful discrimination, then the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant, who “must produce evidence of a legitimate business
justification for the challenged practices or policies.”260 If the
defendant shows such a legitimate business justification for the
allegedly discriminatory practices or policies, then the plaintiff “must
prove that the articulated justification . . . is a pretext for unlawful
discrimination.”261 The plaintiff can prove this pretext “directly with
evidence that an unlawful motive more likely motivated the
respondent, or indirectly” by showing that the defendant’s
justification is not believable or that “there are other practices or
policies available which are equally effective in serving the legitimate
business interests of the [defendant] which do not have similar
discriminatory effects upon members of a protected class.”262
256. Id. R. 24.9.612(1).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. R. 24.9.612(2).
260. Id. R. 24.9.612(3).
261. Id. R. 24.9.612(4).
262. Id. The Montana Commission has also passed a rule addressing “mixed motive”
cases, in which the plaintiff proves unlawful discrimination and the defendant proves that
it would have taken the same action “in the absence of the [allegedly] unlawful
discrimination.” Id. R. 24.9.611(1). In such a case, the Montana Commission has limited its
authority to simply ordering the defendant “to refrain from the discriminatory conduct
and [possibly] impose other conditions to minimize future violations.” Id. The Montana
Commission will not reward money damages in such a case. Id. Because the plaintiff still
must prove discrimination in this scenario, this Comment will focus its analysis on the
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Additionally, BYU CHI likely would not obtain a favorable
result under the disparate impact test. The team would easily
establish a prima facie case by showing that USA Ultimate’s
postseason tournament format and rules substantially and adversely
affect the team’s ability to take full advantage of a place of public
accommodation. BYU CHI would not have to show any intent from
USA Ultimate to establish its prima facie case. It simply needs to
show that it is adversely affected. As with the disparate treatment
test, the burden would then shift to USA Ultimate, which ultimately
should prove fatal for BYU CHI. USA Ultimate would need to show
a legitimate business justification for its policy of having tournaments
on weekends. As in the disparate treatment test, USA Ultimate
should be able to establish a legitimate business interest by showing
that it aims to increase tournament attendance and participation in
the sport by holding tournaments on weekends when most students
are able to attend. Again, BYU CHI would then have to show that
USA Ultimate’s justification is unbelievable pretext, which it will not
be able to do.
To date, no litigation has dealt with discriminatory practices on
religious grounds under the MHRA. A few other claims have been
brought under the statute, though, and they lay some helpful
groundwork. For instance, a party alleging discrimination may
succeed by providing even just one example of discrimination under
the MHRA.263 Overall, however, the MHRA has been the subject of
little litigation as compared to Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Thus, the dearth of case law on this issue necessitates further analysis
of the MHRA and the Montana Commission’s rules.
The statute establishes that denying a protected party access to
the advantages or privileges of a place of public accommodation
because of that party’s religion is unlawful discrimination.264
Furthermore, the statute allows an exception for where the allegedly
discriminatory party has distinguished the member or members of the
protected class “on reasonable grounds.”265 Even without the
reasonable grounds exception, BYU CHI’s claim would appear to be
on shaky ground. After all, USA Ultimate has not disallowed the
team to participate in the postseason because of its religious
disparate treatment and disparate impact tests, which both address proving discrimination
in the first place.
263. Blackfeet Opportunities, Inc. v. Cattin’s Rest., No. BDV-98-767, 1999 Mont. Dist.
LEXIS 216, at *5 (D. Mont. Mar. 22, 1999).
264. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-304(1) (Westlaw through chapters effective, Apr. 3,
2019 sess.).
265. Id.
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convictions. In fact, USA Ultimate allows BYU CHI to participate in
conferences, and the team has done so in the past few years.266
Thus, BYU CHI would need to convince a fact finder that USA
Ultimate commits unlawful discrimination not by blocking the team
from playing in the postseason but by refusing to change a
tournament format that prevents BYU CHI from taking full
advantage of the public accommodation. That argument, while
plausible, stretches the statute’s intent because USA Ultimate is not
preventing BYU CHI from accessing the public accommodation’s
physical space. Also, a fact finder may not decide that this scheduling
issue sufficiently denies the team access to the advantages of the
tournament. Finally, the reasonable grounds exception appears to
allow USA Ultimate the opportunity to show that its allegedly
discriminatory acts result from the schedule that it has used for
tournaments for decades and that this schedule works well with
student-athletes’ academic schedules. While the lack of relevant case
law leaves that interpretation open, USA Ultimate appears to be able
to establish the statutorily requisite reasonable grounds for its refusal
to accommodate.
Since BYU CHI must first bring their claim before the Montana
Commission, it is important to analyze their claim under the
commission’s rules in addition to carrying out a pure statutory
analysis. First, the commission’s policy of construing the MHRA
liberally tends to benefit BYU CHI. The commission, however, has
also established a rule similar to the statutory reasonable grounds rule
by determining that it will avoid causing undue hardship to a party,
which favors USA Ultimate. Thus, while the Montana Commission’s
general policy to read the statutory language and rules broadly to
prevent discrimination favors BYU CHI, the administrative rules
ensure that justice remains the central point of concern.
Additionally, the Montana Commission has adopted a rule
stating that there can be a finding of discrimination when a place of
public accommodation imposes qualification standards that tend to
screen out members of a protected class unless such standards are
“necessary” for the defendant.267 In this case, USA Ultimate’s
tournament format tends to screen out BYU CHI from qualifying for
subsequent rounds of the college postseason. This rule, however, is
geared more toward the place of public accommodation’s initial
qualification standards. In other words, USA Ultimate’s postseason
266. See supra notes 77–90 and accompanying text.
267. MONT. ADMIN. R. 24.9.609(2)(a) (Westlaw through Issue 5 of 2019 Mont. Admin.
Register).
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features a sequential progression of events that most conventional
places of public accommodation would not. For instance, a
conventional membership gym is a place of public accommodation
that does not require its guests to advance past increasingly
competitive levels in order to access the gym’s facilities. For example,
if the membership gym imposed a qualification standard stating that
people who wear a hijab are not allowed to become a member of the
gym, there likely would be an unlawful discrimination because the
gym would have a qualification standard that tends to screen out
Muslim women. USA Ultimate’s weekend schedule, even if BYU
CHI could portray it as a qualification standard, would fall outside
this rule’s ambit.
For the reasons given above, BYU CHI does not appear
positioned to succeed under Montana’s anti-discrimination statute or
administrative rules. As such, BYU CHI’s options under Montana
law run aground.
b.

Washington

The Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”)
protects an individual’s right to be free from discrimination because
of religion, which includes “[t]he right to the full enjoyment of any of
the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any place
of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement.”268
Procedurally, anyone injured by a discriminatory act has the right to
civil action in a state court.269 That person can instead choose to bring
the action to the State’s Human Rights Commission, which has the
power to adjudicate discrimination cases.270
The WLAD broadly defines “full enjoyment,” which expands
beyond simply allowing a member of a protected class to be admitted
to a public accommodation to include a right to be treated as
“welcome, accepted, desired, or solicited.”271 In the public
accommodations context, the WLAD also prohibits “any person or
the person’s agent or employee [from committing] an act which
directly or indirectly results in any distinction, restriction, or
discrimination” based on a person’s membership in a protected
class.272 The Washington Supreme Court has determined that
268. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030(1) (Westlaw through Chapter 9 of 2019 Reg.
Sess.).
269. Id. § 49.60.030(2).
270. Id. § 49.60.230(1)(a). One may appeal from the administrative level to the trial
court level. Id. § 49.60.270.
271. Id. § 49.60.040(14).
272. Id. § 49.60.215.
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discriminating against someone in the public accommodations context
based on the person’s membership in a protected class is “an affront
to personal dignity,” and that a central purpose of the WLAD is to
protect people from such an affront.273 “This broad standard focuses
the liability inquiry on whether actions resulted in discrimination, not
whether the proprietor of a place of public accommodation intended
to discriminate.”274
Washington courts have looked to comparability of treatment in
public accommodation discrimination cases.275 The state’s antidiscrimination law aims primarily to address situations where
defendants refuse or withhold access to places of public
accommodation and their facilities.276 Courts aim to avoid
overburdening businesses by providing them some latitude “in
achieving the goal of comparable treatment.”277
Washington has adopted a burden-shifting approach for
determining whether discrimination has occurred in a place of public
accommodation.278 First, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case
of unlawful discrimination.279 To do so, a plaintiff must prove that
(1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, (2) the
defendant’s establishment is a place of public accommodation,
(3) the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff when it did
not treat the plaintiff in a manner comparable to the treatment
it provides to persons outside that class, and (4) the plaintiff’s
protected status was a substantial factor that caused the
discrimination.280
If the plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case, then the
burden shifts to the defendant to give a “legitimate nondiscriminatory
explanation for its action.”281 If the defendant succeeds, then the
burden returns to the plaintiff, who must show that the defendant’s
proffered
explanation
“is
merely
pretext
for
unlawful
discrimination.”282

273. Floeting v. Grp. Health Coop., 434 P.3d 39, 42 (Wash. 2019).
274. Id. at 41; see also Lewis v. Doll, 765 P.2d 1341, 1345 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that lack of discriminatory intent was irrelevant).
275. Fell v. Spokane Transit Auth., 911 P.2d 1319, 1328 (Wash. 1996).
276. Id.
277. See id.
278. See id. at 1327; Demelash v. Ross Stores, Inc., 20 P.3d 447, 456 (Wash. Ct. App.
2001).
279. Floeting, 434 P.3d at 41; Fell, 911 P.2d at 1328; Demelash, 20 P.3d at 456.
280. Floeting, 434 P.3d at 41.
281. Demelash, 20 P.3d at 456.
282. Id.
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In Spry v. Peninsula School District,283 applying the state’s
burden-shifting approach, parents sued a school district and included
claims under the WLAD that the school district discriminated against
the plaintiff’s children by treating them differently and less favorably
than other children because they were racial and religious
minorities.284 The parents claimed that requests for certain
accommodations were “not addressed as timely as another person’s
request” and that “the school discriminated in its discipline of [the]
children.”285 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
school district; however, the Washington Court of Appeals found that
the plaintiffs “failed to provide evidence of comparators” and so also
“failed to establish a causal connection between their status as a
protected class and any disparate treatment they may have
received.”286 Thus, the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case
of unlawful discrimination and thereby failed to state a claim under
the WLAD.287
Additionally, while Washington law affirmatively requires
parties to accommodate certain other parties to avoid unlawful
discrimination,288 such a requirement to accommodate has only been
applied to the employment realm289 and to disability discrimination in
places of public accommodation.290 Furthermore, the Washington
Supreme Court has “decline[d] to import doctrines developed for the
employment context into the public accommodations context.”291
Thus, while some Washington courts have read into the WLAD a
duty to accommodate in certain limited circumstances, those will not
necessarily apply to the conflict between BYU CHI and USA
Ultimate. For instance, the Washington Supreme Court recently held
283. No. 46782-8-II, 2016 Wash. App. LEXIS 704 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2016).
284. Id. at *1–4.
285. Id. at *5.
286. Id. at *19–20.
287. Id. at *20; see also Demelash, 20 P.3d at 457 (observing that the plaintiff “failed to
produce competent evidence that [the defendant’s] conduct towards him differed from its
treatment” of people not within the defendant’s protected class or that “race/national
origin constituted a substantial factor in motivating [the defendant’s] behavior,” but
reversing the lower court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of the defendant because
the plaintiff sought discovery that “might have evidenced disparate treatment sufficient to
permit [the plaintiff] to establish his prima facie case”).
288. See, e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-32-020(2) (Westlaw through the 18-24 Wash.
State Register) (requiring employers to provide reasonable accommodation for certain
disabilities).
289. See, e.g., Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 325 P.3d 193, 203 (Wash. 2014) (en banc).
290. See, e.g., Wash. State Commc’n Access Project v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 293 P.3d
413, 421–22 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (discussing reasonable accommodations for disabilities
in the public accommodations context).
291. Floeting v. Grp. Health Coop., 434 P.3d 39, 40 (Wash. 2019).
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that an employer had an affirmative duty to reasonably accommodate
employees’ religious practices.292 That rule, however, does not graft
onto cases of alleged religious discrimination in the public
accommodations context though.293
As with Montana law, the WLAD may provide some initial hope
for BYU CHI but will ultimately provide no grounds for relief against
USA Ultimate. Similar to Montana law, the WLAD initially benefits
BYU CHI’s potential claim by expansively defining the full
enjoyment of public accommodations to include the right to access
and feel accepted at a place of public accommodation. Furthermore,
Washington courts have construed the WLAD as establishing a
statewide policy that discrimination is an affront to personal dignity, a
declaration that also favors BYU CHI. Courts have acknowledged,
however, that they must balance considerations of enforcing
accommodations for members of protected classes with the reality
that accommodations must be reasonable in order to avoid
smothering businesses. That consideration benefits USA Ultimate.
In the end, though, Washington’s burden-shifting test pushes the
analysis in USA Ultimate’s favor. Under this test, BYU CHI should
be able to establish a prima facie case because it qualifies as a
member of a protected class; the tournament is a place of public
accommodation; the team can assert that USA Ultimate treated other
people and teams outside of BYU CHI’s protected class differently
than BYU CHI; and the team’s membership in a protected class was a
substantial factor in USA Ultimate’s allegedly discriminatory acts.294
BYU CHI should be able to avoid the evidentiary pitfall that the Spry
plaintiffs encountered because they can more easily point to
comparative treatment.
292. Kumar, 325 P.3d at 200. Additionally, various theories—including disparate
treatment and disparate impact—can be used to prove discrimination in the employment
context. See Goodman v. Boeing Co., 877 P.2d 703, 712 n.7 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). Since
those theories may not necessarily apply in the nondisabilities public accommodations
context, this Comment’s analysis will be contained to the test provided above.
293. Floeting, 434 P.3d at 40–41.
294. Ultimately, the third and fourth prongs may not be so straightforward. A court
would require BYU CHI to show that USA Ultimate treated it differently than other
teams that do not fall within BYU CHI’s protected class, and that USA Ultimate has not
accommodated BYU CHI because of its membership in that protected class. USA
Ultimate, however, arguably is not treating the team differently because of its membership
in a protected class. Instead, it is treating the team the same as every other team by
requiring it to compete in the conventional tournament format. What BYU CHI is asking
for is a special accommodation. It is not asking to be treated like teams outside of its
protected class. During early stages of litigation when the court would view these
assertions in a light most favorable to BYU CHI, however, the court may be willing to
accept the team’s argument. Due to the strike-suit concerns that loom over this type of
conflict, that early-litigation benefit greatly strengthens BYU CHI’s position.
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The state’s burden-shifting approach, however, decisively turns
the tide in USA Ultimate’s favor. If BYU CHI establishes its prima
facie case, then USA Ultimate would need to give a legitimate
nondiscriminatory explanation for its action. As stated earlier, USA
Ultimate would need to assert that it has adopted and adhered to the
weekend tournament format to accommodate student-athletes’
academic schedules and to include the appropriate number of games
in the tournament. They would undoubtedly meet their burden. BYU
CHI would then need to prove that USA Ultimate’s explanation is an
unbelievable discriminatory pretext, which it will not be able to do.
As a result, Washington law provides no remedy for BYU CHI.
c.

Utah

The Utah Civil Rights Act295 (“UCRA”) broadly recognizes that
“the practice of discrimination on the basis of . . . religion . . .
endangers the health, safety, and general welfare of [Utah] and its
inhabitants.”296 The legislation also establishes that discrimination on
the basis of religion in places of public accommodation “violates the
public policy of [Utah].”297 That sweeping statutory language has been
interpreted as an “explicit guarantee of equal treatment [that] reflects
Utah’s public policy” to treat all people fairly and equally and to
prevent unlawful discrimination in places of public accommodation.298
Furthermore, the UCRA charges courts with the responsibility to
construe this legislation “liberally . . . with a view to promote the
policy and purposes of [the UCRA] and to promote justice.”299 The
Utah Supreme Court has determined that this language “amply
demonstrates that the legislature intended [the UCRA] to be
construed as broadly as possible to combat invidious discrimination in
Utah.”300 The legislation contains some breathing room for places of
public accommodation to craft uniform standards, however, by stating
that “[n]othing in [the UCRA] shall be construed to deny any person
295. Although the pertinent statutory chapter is labeled “Civil Rights,” Utah courts
consistently refer to the statutes collectively as the “Utah Civil Rights Act.” See, e.g., Elks
Lodges No. 719 (Ogden) v. Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 905 P.2d 1189, 1191
(Utah 1995); World Peace Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253,
257 (Utah 1994); Benyon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge # 1743, Benevolent & Protective
Order of Elks, 854 P.2d 513, 514 (Utah 1993). This Comment will follow suit.
296. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-7-1 (LEXIS through 2018 3d Spec. Sess.).
297. Id.; see also id. § 13-7-3 (stating that all people in Utah “are free and equal and are
entitled to full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, goods and
services in . . . all places of public accommodation . . . without discrimination on the basis
of . . . religion”).
298. MacArthur v. San Juan Cty., 416 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1181 (D. Utah 2005).
299. § 13-7-1.
300. Benyon, 854 P.2d at 517.
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the right to regulate the operation of a . . . place of public
accommodation . . . in a manner which applies uniformly to all
persons without regard to . . . religion.”301
Additionally, the UCRA provides parties that are subject to
unlawful discrimination a cause of action and ability to sue in court.302
The relevant statute states that any place of public accommodation
that unlawfully discriminates against a member of a protected class is
a “public nuisance” and may be enjoined as provided in the statute.303
Furthermore, the statute grants any person against whom unlawful
discrimination occurs a civil cause of action “for damages and any
other remedy available in law or equity against any person who
[unlawfully discriminates against him].”304 Finally, the statute protects
defendants against frivolous lawsuits by allowing them to recover “all
actual and necessary expenses incurred in” its defense.305 The Utah
Supreme Court has held that a defendant can recover attorney’s fees
and court costs, but only when the presiding court concludes “that [a]
plaintiff’s action, even if brought in good faith, was frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation” or that a “plaintiff continued to
litigate the claim after it had clearly become frivolous, unreasonable,
or without foundation.”306
Few litigants have relied on the UCRA. As a result, Utah courts
have had few chances to interpret the UCRA and provide guidance
for future cases involving allegedly unlawful discrimination. Among
the cases in which the Utah Supreme Court has relied on the UCRA,
the court determined the following: (1) a county ordinance forbidding
massage parlors from offering opposite-sex massages did not violate
the UCRA because the court determined that the UCRA “cannot be
so read as to entitle a member of the public to a massage by a
member of the opposite sex”;307 (2) a nonprofit fraternal organization
with membership criteria was subject to the UCRA despite the fact
301. § 13-7-3.
302. Id. § 13-7-4(3). Because Utah has no administrative body that has the authority to
investigate or adjudicate claims of discrimination, plaintiffs are free to go straight to the
courts. See id.
303. Id. § 13-7-4.
304. Id. § 13-7-4(3).
305. Id. § 13-7-4(4).
306. World Peace Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 262
(Utah 1994) (establishing the attorney’s fees and court costs rule). In World Peace
Movement, the Utah Supreme Court determined that even though the defendant in the
case successfully defended against an unlawful discrimination claim against it, the lower
court should not have awarded the defendant attorney’s fees and court costs because the
plaintiff’s claim was a meritorious question of first impression for the court and was not
frivolous as a matter of law. Id. at 259–62.
307. Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake Cty. Comm’n, 624 P.2d 1138, 1145–46 (Utah 1981).
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that it was a private club because its liquor license rendered it an
enterprise regulated by the state and thus within the ambit of the
UCRA;308 (3) a membership organization subject to the UCRA
violates that law when the organization denies membership to a
person solely because of her gender;309 (4) a publication could not
deny “advertising services on the basis of the religion of the person
seeking those services,” but it “may discriminate on the basis of
content even when content overlaps with a suspect classification like
religion”;310 and (5) “passive discrimination” in the form of written
policies that clearly discriminate but have not yet manifested in an
overtly discriminatory act still qualify as unlawful discrimination.311
The common thread that applies to the present dispute stems from
the Utah Supreme Court’s assertion that the UCRA should be
construed liberally to promote the public policy of ending unlawful
discrimination,312 and that courts interpreting the UCRA should “err
toward over-protection of the enlisted classes rather than toward
under-protection.”313 Interestingly, Utah courts have not
implemented a preferred mode of analysis for unlawful discrimination
in the public accommodations context.314
Unfortunately for BYU CHI, Utah does not provide a home
court advantage. As with Montana and Washington law, the UCRA
does initially look promising. The legislation establishes a broad
308. Benyon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge # 1743, Benevolent & Protective Order of
Elks, 854 P.2d 513, 514–15 (Utah 1993).
309. Id. at 518. The Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed that ruling just two years later in
another case dealing with private fraternal organizations with liquor licenses. Elks Lodges
No. 719 (Ogden) v. Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 905 P.2d 1189, 1206–07 (Utah
1995).
310. World Peace, 879 P.2d at 257–58. The court provided a helpful hypothetical to
illustrate this distinction:
[A] Jewish-owned and -operated newspaper which serves a primarily Jewish
community might lawfully refuse advertisements propagating anti-Semitic
“religious” sentiments. However, that same newspaper could not single out
members of an anti-Semitic religious group and refuse to accept advertisements,
regardless of content, from any member of that group simply because they are a
member of that group. Such discrimination, which is directed at the individual
seeking to place the advertisement rather than at the content of the advertisement,
is prohibited by the [UCRA].
Id. at 258.
311. Elks Lodges, 905 P.2d at 1205–06.
312. See id. at 1204; World Peace, 879 P.2d at 262; Benyon, 854 P.2d at 517.
313. Elks Lodges, 905 P.2d at 1204.
314. Utah courts have, however, used disparate impact and disparate treatment
analyses in other contexts. See, e.g., Malibu Inv. Co. v. Sparks, 996 P.2d 1043, 1050–51
(Utah 2000) (analyzing a housing discrimination claim using disparate impact and
disparate treatment tests); Kunej v. Labor Comm’n, 306 P.3d 855, 862–63 (Utah Ct. App.
2013) (analyzing an employment discrimination claim using a disparate impact test).

2019]

EVALUATING ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS

985

public policy against discrimination, which courts have construed
liberally to ensure protection for members of the enumerated suspect
classes.315 Despite that judicial recognition, Utah courts have found
unlawful discrimination in places of public accommodation only in
instances where there was clear intent to discriminate.316 For example,
the courts have found discrimination when fraternal organizations
refused to accept female members and had standing policies of
accepting only male members.317 On the other hand, the Utah
Supreme Court did not find unlawful discrimination when a
publication refused to publish a religious group’s advertisement
because the court found that the publisher refused the business not
because of the group’s religion but because of its message.318 Thus,
while Utah courts have acknowledged the statutory call to liberally
construe the UCRA, they have not equated this call to an automatic
win for plaintiffs. Instead, the courts simply lean toward
overprotection.
Furthermore, the UCRA statutory language includes a provision
critical to any defense USA Ultimate would present: “Nothing in [the
UCRA] shall be construed to deny any person the right to regulate
the operation of a . . . place of public accommodation . . . in a manner
which applies uniformly to all persons without regard to . . .
religion.”319 While this provision has not been litigated—and thus not
interpreted by Utah courts—it protects defendants that have a
uniform rule or policy that is not designed to distinguish people based
on characteristics associated with a suspect class. USA Ultimate falls
into that enumerated exception because it regulates its tournaments
in a manner that applies uniformly to all teams without regard to any
characteristics associated with a suspect class. Thus, even under a
liberal construction of the UCRA in favor of protecting members of
protected classes, the statute’s express language shields USA
Ultimate.
The statutory preference to protect members of suspect classes
falls short of sustaining BYU CHI’s potential case because the statute
includes an exception for uniform and facially neutral policies. Since
Utah courts have not rendered decisions on many public

315. Benyon, 854 P.2d at 517.
316. See, e.g., id. at 517–19 (holding that a woman was entitled to relief as a matter of
law after a place of public accommodation refused to admit her as a member solely
because she was a female).
317. Elks Lodges, 905 P.2d at 1205–07.
318. World Peace Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 258
(Utah 1994).
319. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-7-3 (LEXIS through 2018 3d Spec. Sess.).
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accommodations cases or developed a consistent analytical
framework for such cases, there may be some room for creative
litigating. Ultimately, however, BYU CHI would likely not succeed
under Utah law.
d.

Idaho

Idaho law establishes that “[t]he right to be free from
discrimination because of . . . creed . . . is recognized as and declared
to be a civil right,” including the “right to the full enjoyment of any of
the accommodations, facilities or privileges of any place of public
resort, accommodation, assemblage or amusement.”320 Specifically,
the Idaho Human Rights Act (“IHRA”) “secure[s] for all individuals
within the state freedom from discrimination” because of religion in
connection with access to and use of public accommodations.321 The
IHRA prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion that results in
the denial of the “full and equal enjoyment” of places of public
accommodation.322 One who believes he or she has been unlawfully
320. IDAHO CODE § 18-7301 (LEXIS through Chapter 197 of 2019 Reg. Sess.). Under
this particular statutory chapter, any person who denies another, on the basis of religion,
the full enjoyment of a public accommodation is guilty of a misdemeanor. Id. § 18-7303.
This statute is part of the penal code, however, and creates no private right of action. See
Foster v. Shore Club Lodge, Inc., 908 P.2d 1228, 1233–34 (Idaho 1995). The Idaho Human
Rights Act, discussed below, provides for civil recourse in the discrimination context.
321. IDAHO CODE § 67-5901(2) (LEXIS through Chapter 197 of 2019 Reg. Sess.).
322. Id. § 67-5909(5). Subsection (5) specifically states that it is prohibited “[f]or a
person . . . [t]o deny an individual the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of a place of public
accommodation.” Id. Separately, subsection (6) of the statute may prohibit one who
“owns, leases or operates a place of public accommodation” from imposing “eligibility
criteria that screen out or tend to screen out” individuals who are in a protected class or
not modifying “policies, practices, or procedures” when they tend to exclude people in a
protected class, unless “such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of [the
place of public accommodation’s] goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or
accommodations.” Id. § 67-5909(6)(b)–(c).
The drafting of the statute, however, makes application of those particular provisions
in this context unclear. The statute begins by stating that “[i]t shall be a prohibited act to
discriminate against a person because of, or on a basis of . . . religion . . . in any of the
following subsections.” Id. § 67-5909 (emphasis added). The statute then specifies that
discriminating on the basis of disability is disallowed as provided in certain subsections,
including subsection (6). Id. Subsection (6) is accordingly drafted to prohibit
discrimination in places of public accommodation “on the basis of disability.” See id. § 675909(6). The provisions in subsection (6) also provide protections, such as requiring places
of public accommodation to make reasonable accommodations for people with
disabilities, that are generally given in the public accommodations context only for people
with disabilities and not for people in other protected classes. See, e.g., Fell v. Spokane
Transit Auth., 911 P.2d 1319, 1323 (Wash. 1996) (stating that a place of public
accommodation can comply with the state’s anti-discrimination laws by providing
reasonable accommodations for a “disabled person’s disability”). In other words, the
statute starts by stating that all of its subsections prohibit discrimination on the basis of
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discriminated against can initiate legal proceedings by filing a
complaint with the Idaho Human Rights Commission (“Idaho
Commission”), an administrative body under the state government.323
A complainant must exhaust administrative avenues before filing in
state court.324
Unfortunately, as with the other states, there is little case law in
this area. Most cases that have involved the IHRA are in the
employment context,325 and courts have adopted consistent analytical
frameworks only in employment discrimination cases.326 One case in
the United States District Court for the District of Idaho actually
analyzed alleged religious discrimination against a Mormon in a
religion, but then it provides a subsection that, by its own language, deals specifically with
discrimination in the disability context and provides public accommodations protections
that are generally given only to people with disabilities and not to people in other
protected classes. Further adding to the confusion, subsection (5) also prohibits
discrimination in places of public accommodation, and does so broadly and in a manner
that conventionally applies to protect members of all protected classes. § 67-5909(5).
Additionally, subsection (5) does not require places of public accommodation to modify
policies or provide reasonable accommodations. Id.
In essence, the statute asserts that all subsections apply to all protected classes but
then provides a subsection that states that it applies to people with disabilities and
provides public accommodations protections traditionally given only in the disabilities
context. This confusion may stem from a 2005 amendment to the statute that added the
disability subsection. See Act of Apr. 5, 2005, ch. 278, sec. 4, § 67-5909, 2005 Idaho Sess.
Laws 869, 872–75 (codified at IDAHO CODE § 67-5909 (LEXIS through Chapter 197 of
2019 Reg. Sess.)). If the reasonable accommodations rule were to apply to all protected
classes, and not just those with disabilities, then places of public accommodation would
need to reasonably accommodate people for characteristics associated with their protected
class. In this case, that would mean USA Ultimate would be exposed to liability much
more than it is in other states, and it might be forced to provide reasonable
accommodations to BYU CHI because of the team’s religious needs. The statute is
unclearly drafted, however, so that issue remains unclear. Due to that unclear drafting,
and taking into account that the reasonable accommodations provided in subsection (6)
generally apply only in the disabilities context, this Comment assumes that only subsection
(5) applies and that USA Ultimate would not be subject to the reasonable
accommodations rule provided in subsection (6).
323. IDAHO CODE § 67-5907(1) (LEXIS through Chapter 197 of 2019 Reg. Sess.).
324. See id. § 67-5908(2). Courts have confirmed that a claim under the IHRA must
start with the Idaho Commission, which was created to oversee these types of issues. See
Boyle v. Jerome Country Club, 883 F. Supp. 1422, 1426 (D. Idaho 1995).
325. See, e.g., Stout v. Key Training Corp., 158 P.3d 971, 973–74 (Idaho 2007)
(concluding that the IHRA did not entitle an employee who won an employment
discrimination lawsuit to attorney’s fees); Foster, 908 P.2d at 1232–33 (analyzing whether
the IHRA contemplated “individual liability for an employer’s agents and employees”);
O’Dell v. Basabe, 810 P.2d 1082, 1096 (Idaho 1991) (determining that “front pay is a
permissible element of damages under the [IHRA]” in employment discrimination cases).
326. See, e.g., Pottenger v. Potlatch Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 745–50 (9th Cir. 2003)
(employing disparate treatment and disparate impact tests in an employment age
discrimination case); Bowles v. Keating, 606 P.2d 458, 462–65 (Idaho 1979) (using
disparate treatment and disparate impact tests in a case concerning sex discrimination in
the employment context).
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sports context similar to the dispute at issue between USA Ultimate
and BYU CHI,327 but the court reviewed only Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and not the IHRA.328 Because there have been few
cases, Idaho courts also have not had the opportunity to further
ingrain public policy against unlawful discrimination by construing
the IHRA liberally.
Additionally, few complaints have been filed with the Idaho
Commission.329 The Idaho Commission has stated that it will construe
its own anti-discrimination rules liberally “to secure just, speedy and
economical determination of all issues presented” to it.330 It does not,
however, specifically say that it will construe the IHRA liberally.331
Finally, the Idaho Commission does provide some guidance on its
website: “Individuals should not be treated more or less favorably in
[the public accommodations context] because of their religious beliefs
or practices. Decisions about providing service . . . should be made
without regard to someone’s religious preferences.”332
Yet again, undeveloped case law renders analyzing this issue in
this state difficult. Idaho’s statutes also establish a public policy that
opposes all forms of discrimination against people in protected
classes, but Idaho courts have not had the opportunity to show how
far this public policy reaches. The IHRA does broadly state that one
cannot “deny an individual [in a protected class] the full and equal
enjoyment of” places of public accommodation,333 but the statute
indicates that one cannot deny “because of” religion,334 which implies
that the statute looks more toward intent than effect. The lack of case
law or administrative guidance also makes analysis difficult, but the
Idaho Commission’s statement that “[i]ndividuals should not be
treated more or less favorably” in this context335 evinces an intent to
allow facially neutral policies or structures, such as a tournament
327. See generally Boyle, 883 F. Supp. 1422 (dealing with a claim of religious
discrimination in the public accommodations context when a Mormon professional golfer
sued a golf course to allow him to play all of his rounds on the Saturday of a golf
tournament in order to allow him not to play on a Sunday). The court ruled for the golf
course after undertaking a burden-shifting analysis. Id. at 1429–33.
328. See id. at 1428–32.
329. Religion, IDAHO HUM. RTS. COMMISSION, https://humanrights.idaho.gov/IdahoLaw/Types-of-Discrimination/Religion [https://perma.cc/DAG3-RPXB] (“Claims of
religious discrimination in [the public accommodations context] are not made very
frequently to the Commission.”).
330. IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 45.01.01.004 (LEXIS through July 1, 2018).
331. See id. r. 45.01.01.012 (addressing the commission’s interpretation of the IHRA
and stating only that certain federal statutes can provide guidance).
332. Religion, supra note 329.
333. IDAHO CODE § 67-5909(5) (LEXIS through Chapter 197 of 2019 Reg. Sess.).
334. Id. § 67-5909 (emphasis added).
335. Religion, supra note 329 (emphasis added).
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schedule, to fall outside of unlawful discrimination. As a result, Idaho
also does not appear to provide BYU CHI a fruitful forum.
III. A NEW STATE STATUTORY APPROACH
The prior sections analyzed the potential avenues that BYU CHI
could take to carry out its veiled threats to litigate its conflict with
USA Ultimate if the governing organization does not find an
acceptable tournament-scheduling compromise. Most sources of law
provide the team with little hope of success. While some state laws
may prove more promising, the lack of extensive precedent creates
significant uncertainty. Courts that have settled upon a preferred
mode of analysis have generally adopted a form of a burden-shifting
approach. Often, those modes of analysis either rely on or combine
intent-based and effect-based tests.
The burden-shifting approach works well in many contexts,
especially when a public accommodation refuses to serve or admit a
member of a protected class. When a member of a protected class
encounters a discriminatory system or structure, however, such as a
rigid sports schedule, the burden-shifting test can be difficult to
overcome because it is often hard to prove pretext that overcomes an
ostensibly legitimate business reason to refuse to accommodate. As a
result, while burden-shifting tests have their benefits, they can be
heavy-handed.
Unsurprisingly, not all instances of potential discrimination fall
neatly into or are optimally resolved by the burden-shifting approach.
The budding conflict between BYU CHI and USA Ultimate presents
an example of such a dispute that is not easily resolved under such
tests. USA Ultimate did not apparently intend to discriminate against
BYU CHI’s predominantly Mormon team by creating the weekend
tournament structure; however, BYU CHI is in a position where that
structure results in a discriminatory effect, and the burden-shifting
test may not appropriately take all of the case’s factors into
consideration.
This Comment proposes a dual analysis that combines aspects of
the intent-based and effect-based aspects of burden-shifting tests in
order to better address cases like the BYU CHI controversy and
thereby fill a gap in the law. This new test would require a fact finder
to undertake a three-step analysis.
First, the fact finder would employ an intent-based approach.
This initial step would resemble other intentional discrimination tests,
where the fact finder would need to find that the plaintiff (1) is a
member of a class protected under the statute, (2) attempted to access
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or enjoy a place of public accommodation, (3) was denied that access
and enjoyment, and (4) was treated less favorably than similarly
situated persons who are not members of the protected class. After
determining that the plaintiff passes this threshold determination, the
court would assess whether the defendant intended to discriminate. If
the alleged discrimination manifested in a refusal to provide service at
or allow access to a place of public accommodation,336 the analysis
should be confined to determining whether the defendant expressed
or acted with animus in the discriminatory action. If, on the other
hand, the fact finder faces an instance of discrimination that results
more from the defendant’s system or structure,337 then the fact finder
should analyze whether there was discriminatory intent or animus
present in the creation of the system or structure. If the fact finder
finds discriminatory intent or animus in either case, then the analysis
should end there with a holding for the party harmed by the
discrimination. If, on the other hand, the fact finder discovers no such
discriminatory intent or animus, then it would move to the second
step of the analysis.
In the second step of the analysis, the fact finder would
determine whether the defendant’s action or structure resulted in a
discriminatory effect. Likely, if the plaintiff has made it this far in the
analysis, this prong should be met. That is because the four-part test
above determines whether the plaintiff has standing under the statute
to meet the effect-based test; it determines that a member of a
protected class tried to use a public accommodation and was denied
even though others outside the protected class had access. If this
finding is met, then the fact finder could move to the final step of the
analysis.
Under the third step, the fact finder would assess whether the
defendant exhibited discriminatory intent or animus in the refusal to
accommodate. For example, if a plaintiff of a protected class
encounters some discriminatory effect by a defendant or their
policies, yet there is no discriminatory intent or animus in the creation
or implementation of that defendant’s system or policy, then the
plaintiff may still succeed in proving discrimination if the defendant
336. For instance, a recent case relating to a cakeshop’s refusal to bake a wedding cake
for a homosexual couple represents a prototypical example of a refusal to serve that
results more from a one-off decision than from the implementation of some elemental
structure of the cakeshop. See generally Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (discussing whether a government commission violated
the First Amendment when it evaluated a bakery that refused to make a cake for a gay
couple).
337. For instance, the weekend tournament format that USA Ultimate uses does not
constitute a one-off direct refusal to allow BYU CHI to participate.
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exhibits discriminatory intent or animus in the refusal to
accommodate the plaintiff. If a fact finder discovers discriminatory
intent at this stage, then there is a finding of discrimination.
This combined approach begins to fill a gap by combining intentand effect-based approaches and allowing for findings of animus at
multiple stages. While the third step may prove redundant or possibly
inapplicable to directly discriminatory actions,338 it better and more
fairly captures cases where a plaintiff encounters a system that may
not have been established or structured with the intent to
discriminate but which has the effect of discriminating. If a plaintiff
collides with such a structure, bargains with the party presiding over
that structure to seek accommodation, and the presiding party refuses
to accommodate, then a plaintiff can attempt to prove discriminatory
intent in the refusal to accommodate.339 This approach more fairly fills
the gap by providing plaintiffs multiple opportunities to prove
discrimination but still prevents a finding of discrimination if a
defendant presides over a structure that has an inadvertent
discriminatory effect on a suspect class. This test also replaces the
often-insurmountable “pretext” stage of a burden-shifting approach
by focusing on the animus in a refusal to accommodate instead of the
business, logistical, or other reasons for refusing to accommodate.
The test suggested above differs slightly from other tests in that
the discriminatory intent or animus can be found not only in the
establishment or operation of a system—such as an ultimate
tournament—but also in the refusal to accommodate by changing the
system. Despite the benefits of such a test, some drawbacks remain.
First, just as effect-based approaches may encourage more litigious
behavior by plaintiffs, this test’s inclusion of the effect-based step may
338. For example, if a proprietor of a place of public accommodation refuses to serve a
member of a protected class, then the discriminatory intent is wrapped both in the action
that would result in a finding of discrimination under the first step of the test and a finding
at this stage. Of course, the fact finder should not reach this stage of the test if it finds
under the first part of the test, so the third step likely would not apply in these instances.
339. One point of distinction that states would need to consider at this stage would be
who carries the burden of proof. Up to this point, the plaintiff will have carried the
burden, and that likely should continue. So, if the plaintiff were to carry the burden of
proof at the third stage, then she would need to elicit convincing evidence of
discriminatory intent in the defendant’s refusal to accommodate. On the other hand, states
could opt to treat the discriminatory effect portion of the test as prima facie evidence of
discrimination that the defendant would need to rebut. Under that test, the defendant
likely would need to show a legitimate reason—for instance, convenience or necessity—
for why it refused to accommodate. Keeping the burden of proof with the plaintiff is the
better course, however, because animus at this stage is more reasonably proven through
proof of that animus than it is by whether the defendant can point to an alternative reason
to refuse to accommodate, which the defendant could craft even if it did act
discriminatorily.
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similarly leave the door open to litigation. On the other hand, the fact
remains that a plaintiff would still need to prove discriminatory intent
or animus at some stage of its interaction with a defendant, which will
remain a difficult burden in many cases.340 Thankfully, the entirety of
the test dampens these negative aspects. The test assuages the first
drawback by continuing to require some proof of discriminatory
intent, which could stave off frivolous lawsuits. The test also lightens
the second drawback because the analysis effectively requires the
parties to bargain, discuss, or negotiate an accommodation for the
plaintiff, which increases the likelihood that discriminatory intent or
animus would manifest itself. Furthermore, even with the potential
drawbacks, the test proffered above combines aspects of the intentoriented and effect-oriented aspects of the burden-shifting approach
in a way that more accurately addresses discrimination that can arise
in several ways and encourages the parties to address their differences
outside of the court system.
This hybrid test would apply more ideally in the BYU CHI and
USA Ultimate dispute than conventional discrimination tests would.
While a burden-shifting test appears to offer USA Ultimate a
favorable outcome, this Comment’s dual test cuts much more closely
to the meat of the issue. First, the fact finder would determine
whether BYU CHI has standing under the statute as a member of a
protected class that attempted to access or enjoy a place of public
accommodation but was denied even though the space was open to
others outside the class. The fact finder would then assess whether
USA Ultimate constructed the weekend tournament format with
discriminatory intent or animus.341 If the fact finder were to find such
animus, the analysis would end and BYU CHI would win. On the
other hand, if the fact finder were not to find such animus, then she
would assess whether the tournament format resulted in
discriminatory effect. If so, then the fact finder would undertake the
final part of the analysis and ascertain whether USA Ultimate

340. In other words, not all parties acting with discriminatory intent will manifest that
intent such that the plaintiff can prove it. Sophisticated parties conscious of antidiscrimination laws may be shrewd or well counseled enough to avoid expressing its
animus. This fact, of course, intersects with the burden-of-proof issue discussed supra note
339. Directly proving discriminatory intent may be difficult for the plaintiff, but shifting
the burden to the defendant easily allows it to craft creative reasons for the refusal to
accommodate after the discriminatory act. Someone must carry the burden, however, and
it makes sense to require the party alleging discrimination to prove it. Perhaps courts
could allow plaintiffs to allege lack of alternative reasons to accommodate as probative of
intent in order to shift some of the upper hand back to the plaintiff.
341. In other words, the court would determine whether USA Ultimate created the
weekend tournament format in order to block Mormons from participating.
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exhibited discriminatory intent or animus in its refusal to
accommodate BYU CHI. Discussions between the parties concerning
accommodation would provide some prediscovery evidence that the
court could analyze, and later discovery could provide further
evidence potentially probative of the defendant’s intent.342 Of course,
issues concerning USA Ultimate’s proffered reasons for refusal to
accommodate—namely, convenience for the participating studentathletes—would arise too. If the fact finder discovered discriminatory
intent at this stage, then BYU CHI would have a much better chance
of succeeding. If not, then USA Ultimate likely would win. Either
way, the test would have better captured and addressed the issue that
the parties were facing.
CONCLUSION
BYU CHI has developed from a good team to a powerful
program in the past several years under Coach Bryce Merrill. Time
and again, the team has proven its national relevance, beating ranked
teams and earning its own high rankings in the process. The team’s
desire to seek an accommodation from USA Ultimate that would
allow them to participate meaningfully in the postseason—what any
athlete in any sport desires—is elementally understandable and
reasonable. To their credit, the team has continued to petition USA
Ultimate and generate conversation in the ultimate community in a
professional and productive manner.
With the threat of litigation looming over the parties and the
effective strike-suit precedent laid down by BYU’s men’s rugby team,
however, an analysis of the potential founts of legal recourse is
prudent. As the analysis above shows, current federal and state laws
appear to heavily favor USA Ultimate because of the prevalence of
burden-shifting approaches or the wording of statutes. In reality,
these approaches do not optimally cut to the center of conflicts that
involve facially neutral structures or systems that have a
discriminatory effect. That is the conflict developing between BYU
CHI and USA Ultimate.
To address the gap that results from the burden-shifting
approach, this Comment proposes a new test that retains desirable
features of the conventional tests while also better addressing
instances where nuanced discriminatory intent or effect may not be
342. Ideally, courts would allow only a limited form of discovery in order to help the
parties avoid significant litigation costs at this stage. If full discovery were allowed too
early, then strike-suit concerns would continue to play too great a role and potentially
force settlements on frivolous claims.
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adequately addressed by the conventional tests. Using the ultimate
dispute that frames this Comment as an example, the proposed test
more neatly dissects the issues embedded within the potential
discrimination and is thus more likely to bring about a just result.
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